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Palsgraf-ian Proximate Cause and Insurance
Law: The State of New York Additional
Insured Coverage Following Burlington
Insurance Co. v. NYC Transit Authority
RYAN P. MAXWELL†
INTRODUCTION
This Comment is a study of construction accident
litigation and, in particular, of the insurance coverage
available to additional insureds under endorsements
permitted in the state of New York. Specifically, the
discussion will center around the scope of coverage permitted
in New York State under the most common additional
insured endorsements used by insurance companies that
provide coverage for “liability caused, in whole or in part, by”
the acts or omissions of the named insured.

† J.D. Candidate, 2019, University at Buffalo School of Law; B.S. Media &
Communications, 2011, Medaille College; Articles Editor, Buffalo Law Review;
Law Clerk, Hurwitz & Fine, P.C. I would be remiss if I failed to thank my diligent
Buffalo Law Review colleagues, who painstakingly poured through these pages
to a fine polish. Additionally, I would like to thank Professor Matthew Steilen for
providing valuable insight into the artistry that is academic scholarship.
Furthermore, I would like to thank the talented attorneys comprising the
Insurance Coverage practice group of Hurwitz & Fine, P.C., for not only
highlighting the importance of the Burlington Insurance Co. v. NYC Transit
Authority decision for myself and others, but also for actively cultivating both an
internal and industry-wide inquisitive and collaborative community of insurance
practitioners, past, present and future.
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Serving as a catalyst to the commentary that follows is
the evolution of additional insured precedent currently
unfolding in New York, and in particular a recent decision
handed down by the New York Court of Appeals, Burlington
Insurance Co. v. NYC Transit Authority.1 It is wellunderstood that an entity with “additional insured” status
“enjoy[s] the same protection as the named insured” under a
policy of insurance.2 However, one must initially determine
the threshold matter of whether an entity qualifies as an
“additional insured” under a policy before the insurer owes
that entity any obligations under its policy. Although the
exact degree to which additional insured status may be
extended to general contractors and property owners in New
York under Burlington remains unclear, the intent of this
piece is to show that the invocation of “proximate cause,” as
that term was used by Justice Andrews in his dissent in
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,3 carries a certain
connotation that allows courts to assign financial liability to
insurers based upon the blameworthiness of individual
insureds.4 Since additional insured status is arguably
contingent upon the blameworthiness or level of fault
attributed to the named insured under a policy of insurance,
this view would allow Palsgraf-ian proximate cause to sever
the causal connection necessary to trigger coverage under an
insurance policy for an entity claiming additional insured
status as the blameworthy party primarily—and
substantially—at fault.
To provide a roadmap, I will approach my analysis of the
1. 79 N.E.3d 477 (N.Y. 2017).
2. Pecker Iron Works of N.Y., Inc. v. Traveler’s Ins. Co., 786 N.E.2d 863, 864
(N.Y. 2003); see also Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 703 N.E.2d
1221, 1226 (N.Y. 1998) (“The [insurance] policy . . . was designed to provide
primary insurance for [the named insured] and thus, after finding that [the
owner/lessor] was an additional insured under this policy, it would naturally
follow that coverage of [the additional insured] was also primary.”).
3. 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
4. Throughout this piece, I will refer to this concept as “Palsgraf-ian
proximate cause.”
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scope of Palsgraf-ian proximate cause in the realm of New
York insurance law in four distinct parts. Part I consists of a
brief overview regarding the role that additional insured
endorsements play in commercial general liability (CGL)
policies issued to “downstream” entities or subcontractors, as
well as the evolution of such endorsements and how courts
have interpreted the language included therein. Part II
discusses the proximate cause limitations that this language
imposes upon coverage for general contractors and property
owners ultimately held solely liable for the injuries and
damages incurred following construction accidents. At the
opposite extreme, Part III addresses the broad application of
additional insured status in regards to an insurer’s duty to
defend, where liability has yet to be established and the
allegations in the complaint raise potential liability on behalf
of the “downstream” subcontractor. Finally, Part IV attempts
to bridge the divide between an insurer’s broad duty to
defend, and the lack of additional insured status without
fault on behalf of the named insured. This final Part
advances my theory in which the “Palsgraf-ian” proximate
cause requirement imposed on “liability caused, in whole or
in part” language in Burlington could potentially sever the
chain of causation where a subcontractor was tenuously at
fault.
I. THE ROLE AND EVOLUTION OF THE ADDITIONAL INSURED
ENDORSEMENT IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
In this Part, I will briefly explore the basics of risk
transfer in the complex and often dangerous area of largescale construction projects, including the contractual risk
transfer provisions between parties and the insurance
requirements frequently accompanying such contractual
relationships. Additionally, this Part will dissect the most
recent changes in the area of standardized additional
insured provisions and how such provisions have been
applied by the courts.
Visit any big city in the world today and you will
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unavoidably encounter massive, large-scale construction
projects and real estate development, commercial or
otherwise. Active worksites are beehives of activity, with
heavy machines in operation and the use of high-powered
tools as far as the eye can see. Indeed,
[c]onstruction is an inherently complex business. Even casual
observers of the construction process are struck by the enormous
amount of information required to construct a project. Hundreds,
even thousands, of detailed drawings are required. Hundreds of
thousands of technical specifications, requests for information, and
other documents are needed. Complex calculations are used to
produce the design. For years, this complexity dictated a laborintensive, highly redundant methodology for doing the work.
Projects were fragmented and broken into many parts. Different
entities undertook different parts of a project, both for design and
construction. Therefore, the construction industry became
exceptionally fragmented. On a project of even average complexity,
there may have been from 5 to 15 firms involved in design. From 40
to 100 companies may have been engaged in construction. Many
more companies supplied materials, professional services, and other
elements necessary for completion of the project.5

Although pre-planned and heavily choreographed, these
complex projects, many times comprising the moving of earth
and iron, occasionally have unexpected consequences. And
when such consequences arise, insurance carriers ultimately
pay the price. But which insurance policy or insurer should
provide coverage for the accident, injuries, and damages that
result? Should the subcontractor ultimately be held
accountable? Was the general contractor solely at fault?
Were both responsible, either in whole or in part? Should it
matter?
In the middle of the twentieth century, the evolution of
tort law led many to increasingly look beyond fault and some
courts began concerning themselves with “who was best able
to reduce the number and cost of injuries, insure against
them, or redistribute costs in order to spread the burden

5. 1 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND O’CONNOR
LAW § 1:2 (2002) (citing John W. Hinchey, Visions for the Next
Millennium, in 1 CONSTRUCTION LAW HANDBOOK § 2.01 [A] (1999)).
ON CONSTRUCTION
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among all those connected to an enterprise.”6 Among the
purposes of modern tort law is the imposition of liability on
those in the best position to secure insurance and provide for
loss distribution across a broader population, relieving the
injured party from shouldering the burden themselves.7 But
this raises an interesting question: To what extent can fault
be ignored when assigning financial blame for the purposes
of tort law? Since the financial compensation for injuries
resulting from accidents does not occur within a vacuum and,
in many cases, overlapping insurance companies are on the
hook for ultimate payment of a settlement or monetary
judgment following litigation, the line for who should be held
at fault must be drawn somewhere.8
This approach to modern tort law became increasingly
relevant after the expansion of tort law during the Industrial
Revolution. The increase in efficiency through the use of
dangerous machines during the Industrial Revolution
sparked significant changes to the modern tort law system;
chief among them was concern for the safety of the American
worker. The construction industry with its complexities is
but one example of an area where such changes to the system
of tort law and worker safety were deemed necessary.9
In response to the changes protecting workers, many
property owners, contractors, and their contractual partners
sought their own protections from liability in the form of
insurance coverage and the concept of risk transfer.10 The

6. DAVID M. ENGEL, THE MYTH OF THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 10 (John M. Conley
& Lynn Mather eds., 2016).
7. Id. at 15.
8. For a theoretical discussion as to where a line could potentially be drawn,
see discussion infra Part IV.
9. Philip L. Bruner, The Historical Emergence of Construction Law, 34 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 12 (2007) (“Construction’s complexity has created recognized
public safety risks, which in turn has led to increased governmental regulation
of the construction process through legislative imposition of licensing laws, safety
regulations, and building codes.”).
10. See MARSHALL WILSON REAVIS III, INSURANCE: CONCEPTS & COVERAGE 66
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risk transfer concept dictates that “[a] risk of economic loss
that could be caused by a particular loss exposure can be
transferred to another party through a provision in a
contract.”11 Specifically, within the construction industry,
[property] owners will compel general contractors to provide trade
contract indemnity via hold harmless agreements and, perhaps
more importantly, insurance protection through the requirement
that the owners be added as additional insureds under identified
policies of insurance issued to the general contractors. General
contractors then continue to pass risk down by compelling their
subcontractors to do the same, naming the general contractor as an
additional insured in policies where the subcontractor is the named
insured.12

Under this model, many, if not most, contractual
relationships between property owners, general contractors,
and subcontractors require liability insurance that covers
defense, settlement, and judgment costs arising from injuries
on a worksite and shifting liability risks “downstream.”13

(2012).
11. Id.
12. Dan D. Kohane & Jennifer A. Ehman, Insurance Law, 68 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 914, 930 (2018) (footnote omitted). I am grateful to Dan and Jennifer for
allowing me to contribute to their New York State Insurance Law Survey
spanning July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2017. Although not a focus of this piece,
“[a] hold harmless agreement is an example where a [downstream] contractor
assumes the liability of a building owner [or other contractor] for any loss that
might occur while the contractor is working on the building.” REAVIS, supra note
10, at 66.
13. See Nicholas N. Nierengarten, New ISO Additional Insured
Endorsements, 44 BRIEF 30, 31 (2014); Trisha Strode, From the Bottom of the Food
Chain Looking Up: Subcontractors Are Finding That Additional Insured
Endorsements Are Giving Them Much More Than They Bargained For, 23 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 697, 702 (2004); see also Terry J. Galganski et al., A
Construction Lawyer’s Top 10 Additional-Insured Considerations, 30
CONSTRUCTION LAW. 5, 14 (2010) (“When drafting a contract provision to ensure
your client is properly named as an additional insured, the following basic rules
should be followed: (1) as part of the contract negotiating process, the party
seeking additional-insured status should request a copy of the additional-insured
endorsement that provides such coverage from the other party, (2) assure the
most important coverage for an additional insured is obtained through the other
party’s primary CGL policy, and (3) the contract and the additional-insured
endorsement should provide that the underlying insurance is primary.”).
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It is clear that contractual relationships often require a
“downstream” subcontractor to list its “upstream” general
contractor(s) and property owner(s) as additional insureds
under its CGL insurance policy.14 What is less clear of these
relationships is the extent to which coverage must be
afforded absent fault on behalf of the subordinate entity. An
additional insured’s coverage “is typically limited to liability
arising out of the named insured’s work or
operations . . . [and] does not provide coverage to an
additional insured for the additional insured’s own work or
operations.”15 Most often, CGL policies utilize additional
insured endorsements published by the Insurance Services
Office, Inc. (ISO), “an association of approximately 1,400
domestic property and casualty insurers . . . [and] the almost
exclusive source of support services in this country for CGL
insurance,” which “develops standard policy forms and files
or lodges them with each State’s insurance regulators.”16
In no sense are additional insured endorsements a new
concept. The ISO first introduced such additional insured
endorsements in 1973, originally in two separate varieties
known as “Form A” and “Form B.”17 These forms were
developed to fill a need with respect to the extension of
14. See Strode, supra note 13, at 702; Ellen Chappelle, The Evolution of
Additional Insured Endorsements, 23 CONSTRUCTION LITIG. 10, 10 (2014).
15. 3 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 40:26 (3d ed. 2017).
16. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993); see also First
Mercury Ins. Co. v. Shawmut Woodworking & Supply, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 158,
173 n.17 (D. Conn. 2014); BILL WILSON, WHEN WORDS COLLIDE: RESOLVING
INSURANCE COVERAGE AND CLAIMS DISPUTES 49 (2018) (stating that, except for
inland marine insurance forms, “ISO forms tend to dominate the marketplace,
especially in commercial lines”); Steven G.M. Stein & Jean Gallo Wine, The
Illusions of Additional Insured Coverage, 34 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 14, 14 (2014)
(“The influence of the ISO on the language contained in CGL policies cannot be
overstated, and the majority of CGL policies either follow the ISO forms to the
letter or draw heavily on language issued by the ISO.”); Strode, supra note 13, at
703. Not to be forgotten, many insurers issuing property and casualty insurance
policies use forms issued by the American Association of Insurance Services
(AAIS) as well.
17. James D. O’Connor, Additional Insured Coverage: The Why, The What &
The Wherefore, 11 J. AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAW. 69, 69 (2017).
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liability from worksite injuries to property owners and/or
developers.18 At that point in time, the scope of coverage
under these forms was significantly limited, with the more
expansive Form B granting additional insured status to a
covered entity only with respect to claims reasonably tied to
the work the named insured was providing the additional
insured, protecting only direct liability exposure for the
owner.19 The intended niche that additional insured coverage
originally sought to fill was readily apparent in the ISO’s use
of the phrase “owners and lessees,” with “contractors” only
added several years later in 1985.20
Since 1973, there have been several iterations of these
ISO forms, and the application of additional insurance
provisions, including whether they extend to “direct liability,
vicarious liability, or something in between,” is dependent
upon the wording of the particular endorsement used. 21
Some commentators have cautioned that “[i]t is, of course,
the language of the endorsements which controls, not selfserving notions circulated in the insurance industry as to

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Nierengarten, supra note 13, at 32; see also 4 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK
J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 11:338 (2018)
(“Twenty years ago, additional insured endorsements came in two flavors: the
short form and the long form. Today there are more flavors than found in a
Baskin-Robbins ice cream shop. There are endorsements that limit coverage to
ongoing operations; whereas others cover completed operations. Many
endorsements have a written agreement requirement, but this also can vary from
an enforceable written agreement to an ‘insured contract’ as defined by the policy.
Some policies apply only to liability the additional insured incurs as a result of
the sole negligence of the named insured. Others are characterized by ‘caused in
whole or in part’ language.”); JOHN H. MATHIAS, JR. ET AL., INSURANCE COVERAGE
DISPUTES § 1.01 (2017) (“The form of the endorsement extending ‘additional
insured’ status may determine whether coverage is extended to additional
insureds for liabilities resulting from their own acts or omissions or only for their
vicarious liability for the acts of the named insured. Thus, care must be used in
assessing the extent of coverage afforded by virtue of an ‘additional insured’
endorsement.”).
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what the forms were intended to do.”22 In essence, although
the purpose and intent behind the ISO’s choice of language
may be relevant to the meaning of the endorsement that is
crafted, it is the courts that will ultimately determine
whether the legal interpretations of the policy language are
all that different than previous iterations used.
The ISO’s “CG 20 33 07 04” standard form additional
insured endorsement modifies who is considered an insured
under a CGL policy, reading in pertinent part:
This endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following:
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART
A. Section II—Who Is An Insured is amended to include as
an additional insured any person or organization for whom you
are performing operations when you and such person or
organization have agreed in writing in a contract or agreement
that such person or organization be added as an additional
insured on your policy. Such person or organization is an
additional insured only with respect to liability for “bodily
injury”, “property damage” or “personal and advertising
injury” caused, in whole or in part, by:
1. Your acts or omissions; or
2. The acts or omissions of those acting on your

22. SCOTT C. TURNER, INSURANCE COVERAGE OF CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES
§ 42:4 (2d ed. 2017). This is not a new concept when it comes to interpreting the
language in insurance policies, and insurance industry intent is often viewed as
but one factor in the equation. See, e.g., Tri-Star Theme Builders, Inc. v.
OneBeacon Ins. Co., 426 F. App’x 506, 512 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The intent of the
insurance industry draftsmen . . . is not controlling. . . . Such evidence ‘might be
persuasive if the controversy . . . were between two insurers,’ or if it suggested
that the language reflected the mutual intent of the parties.”); Randy Maniloff,
Additional Insured Endorsements: ISO’s Revisions, PUB. LIABILITY, May 2004, at
M.23-2 (“It is often said—and for good reason—that the analysis of any insurance
coverage issue must begin with the policy language itself.”); id. at M.23-6 (“The
real test, of course, is not whether insurers can convince themselves that their
policy language achieves their drafting intent, but courts. After all, insurers were
no doubt certain that the predecessors to form CG 20 10 07 04 were perfectly
suited to achieve the intended result concerning the extent of coverage available
for additional insureds. And then the black robes had their say.”). But see WILSON,
supra note 16, at 69 (noting that ISO forms filings can be invaluable extrinsic
information when interpreting “the intent of policy language”); id. at 101.
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behalf . . . .23

As with many areas of business, the insurance industry
tends to react as relevant precedent is formulated by the
courts that modifies the risks involved in “doing an insurance
business.”24 In accordance with this industry-wide trend, the
most commonly used “additional insured endorsement[s]
have evolved over time from broad coverage for the owner’s
own negligence to narrow coverage for exactly what is
specified in the construction contract.”25 The “caused, in
whole or in part, by” language included in the July 2004
version of the ISO standard form above reflects the ISO’s
acknowledgement that its prior “arising out of” phrasing had
been interpreted by courts too broadly.26 Beyond what the

23. ISO PROPERTIES, INC., ISO COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY FORM CG 20
33 07 04 (2004).
24. See generally WILSON, supra note 16, at 42 (“[I]nsurers, or form standards
organizations like the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO) . . . do not write
policies for insureds, but rather they craft and then modify policies for the courts
that are the ultimate arbiters of coverage. Many policy provisions have already
been interpreted by the courts, in particular precedent-setting appeals courts. . . .
[W]hen these appellate courts render interpretations that are either unexpected
or unintended from the standpoint of the insurance industry, endorsements may
be issued to tweak a policy term to better clarify the policy language.”). For more
information regarding the scope of what it means to be conducting a business of
insurance in New York State, see N.Y. INS. LAW § 1101 (McKinney 2018).
25. Chappelle, supra note 14, at 12.
26. See Maniloff, supra note 22, at M.23-2 to M.23-5. Although the “ISO’s
filing memorandum does not mention by name any of the cases that have
construed the phrase ‘arising out of’ broadly,” id. at M.23-2, cases like Regal
Constr. Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 930 N.E.2d 259 (N.Y.
2010) and Maroney v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 839 N.E.2d 886 (N.Y.
2005) are two such examples in New York State, albeit decided subsequent to the
ISO revisions, since existing insurance policies still contained the outmoded
endorsements. Interestingly enough, the ISO’s intentions with these revisions
seem to suggest that they sought to have their cake and eat it too. See Maniloff,
supra note 22, at M.23-2 (“Ironically, while ISO laments a broad construction of
the phrase ‘arising out of’ in its additional insured endorsements, insurers have
benefited from the broad construction that courts have given to the phrase
‘arising out of’ when it appears in a policy exclusion. Many courts have held that,
when used in a policy exclusion, the phrase ‘arising out of’ means ‘but for.’ As a
result, policy-holders have sometimes been left to believe that coverage has been
improperly denied because of exclusions that have painted with too broad a
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ISO intended, the broad interpretation by the majority of
courts was that the phrase “arising out of” extended the
scope of coverage to encompass an additional insured’s sole
negligence, so long as the injury was causally connected to
the business relationship of the named insured and
additional insureds.27 In an industry where the
predictability of future risks occurring is central and
foundational, such a broad interpretation reduced the
accuracy of the valuation and pricing of coverage premiums:
Many courts interpreted “arising out of” to be a simple causation
test and, therefore, afforded direct primary coverage to the
additional insured. The ISO hope[d] that, by substituting “caused
by” for “arising out of,” a narrower coverage interpretation will be
afforded. Moreover, the revised language specifie[d] that coverage
is afforded the additional insured for liability arising out of the
named insured’s “acts or omissions,” not simply the named insured’s
operations. Arguably, the absence of fault on behalf of the named
insured results in a finding of no coverage for the additional
insured.28

brush. It seems that what the phrase ‘arising out of’ giveth to insurers in
exclusions, it taketh away in additional insured endorsements.”).
27. Jack P. Gibson & W. Jeffrey Woodward, The 2004 ISO Additional Insured
Endorsement Revisions, 25 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 5, 5–6 (2005); see also
Nierengarten, supra note 13, at 32 (“Most courts have held that the phrase
‘arising out of’ covers both direct and vicarious liability.”); O’Connor, supra note
17, at 101 (“Courts . . . rejected vicarious liability end-run attempts, reasoning
that the change in the ‘standard’ form language only sought to put an end to AI
‘sole negligence’ coverage.”). In fact, many states have statutory provisions
rejecting any indemnity for the sole negligence of the potential indemnitee, often
leaving questions pertaining to the enforceability of additional insured
endorsements that arguably provide such coverage. See generally Allen Holt
Gwyn & Paul E. Davis, Fifty-State Survey of Anti-Indemnity Statutes and Related
Case Law, 23 CONSTR. LAW. 26, 28–33 (2003) (providing a grid summarizing the
anti-indemnity statutes and related case law in all fifty states).
28. BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 21, § 11:338; see also Patrick J.
O’Connor, Jr., Recent Developments in Insurance Law, 7 J. AM. C. CONSTRUCTION
LAW. 1 (2013) (“The insurance industry developed additional insured
endorsements that did away with the ‘arising out of” the named insured’s
operations and replaced it with ‘caused, in whole or in part, by’ the named
insured. This was done to avoid the ‘fault-free interpretation’ that many courts
had given the ‘arising out of’ language. On the one hand, the ‘caused, in whole or
in part, by’ standard is not remarkably more stringent than a fault-free trigger
for additional insured coverage. If the named insured is arguably one percent at
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Other commentators and practitioners have shared this
view, given that “[t]his is, after all, the named insured’s
policy, and the only way one is supposed to obtain additional
insured coverage is if there is actual liability on the part of
the named insured . . . .”29 Generally, the ISO’s CG 20 10 07
04 form is thought to cover concurrent liability on behalf of
both the named and additional insureds.30 Additionally, the
inclusion of “in part” limits coverage for the additional
insured’s own liability to scenarios in which “the acts or
omissions of the named insured (or those acting on its behalf,
such as subcontractors) played at least some part in causing
the injury or damage at issue[]”:31
The clear intent of the 2004 modification of both new AI forms was
to reduce the scope of coverage to the AI and expressly link AI
coverage to the Named Insured’s own involvement in the acts giving
rise to the claim against the AI. By conditioning coverage to the AI
upon the Named Insured’s “causal” behaviors, the new endorsement
closed the “sole negligence” loophole that had bedeviled the

fault, then coverage, at least a defense obligation, is made out. In practice,
however, this trigger presents some problems . . . .”); BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra
note 21, § 11:334 (same); John Liner Organization, Using Additional Insured
Endorsements, THE JOHN LINER LETTER, Aug. 2004, at 1 (“This filing continues a
decade-old trend in which ISO and insurers have eroded the value of additional
insured endorsements. More and more, insurers are making it clear that you
cannot use an additional insured endorsement as your own insurance policy to
cover costs unrelated to the negligence of the named insured.”).
29. Jeff Sistrunk, NY Ruling Curtails Contractors’ Additional Insured
Coverage, LAW 360 (June 7, 2017, 10:46 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/932049/ny-ruling-curtails-contractors-additional-insured-coverage
(quoting Larry Golub, Partner at Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP).
30. Nierengarten, supra note 13, at 32 (“The objective was to eliminate
coverage for the AI’s sole negligence but continue to provide coverage for the AI’s
own liability even if the AI’s fault was a major cause, provided that the named
insured’s activities played some part in the injuries or damages.”); see also
Maniloff, supra note 22, at M.23-6 (“[W]hile it is accurate to say in general terms
that form CG 20 10 07 04 provides coverage for an additional insured for its
contributory negligence, a review of the policy language reveals that there is an
important qualification to this intended grant of coverage.”).
31. Roberta Anderson, ISO’s 2013 “Additional Insured” Endorsement
Changes Merit Close Attention, 23 INS. COVERAGE LITIG., May-June 2013, at 33,
35 (2013).
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construction industry.32

To help frame the discussion that follows, it is important
to understand that the question of whether or not an entity
is an additional insured under a policy is critical. Unlike noncoverage by way of a policy exclusion, the lack of additional
insured status serves to negate the policy’s grant of coverage
to said entity altogether.33 At the very least, a “complaint
may need to allege some negligence on the part of the named
insured to trigger coverage for the additional insured” under
the ISO’s July 2004 revisions.34 However, such a minimum
standard of pleading does not answer the full scope of
coverage to be afforded, if any coverage is to be afforded at
all.
As early as May 2006, courts began interpreting the
“caused, in whole or in part, by” language in additional
insured endorsement language.35 In American Empire
32. O’Connor, supra note 17; see also John Liner Organization, supra note 28,
at 2-3 (“ISO and insurers contend that the intent is to primarily cover the
additional insured’s vicarious liability.”).
33. Harco Constr., LLC v. First Mercury Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.S.3d 495, 497–98
(App. Div. 2017). As an aside, I credit University at Buffalo School of Law Adjunct
Professor and Legal Practitioner, Dan Kohane, for sharing his aptly named
“Kohane Coverage Formula,” which establishes that an insurance policy’s
Coverage = [(WI) – WO)] + CPC, where WI stands for what is initially within the
coverage of the four corners of the policy (i.e., “what’s in”), WO stands for what
has been excluded from such initial coverage by the terms of the policy (i.e.,
“what’s out”), and CPC stands for compliance with policy conditions for which
non-compliance (i.e., a value of zero) may eliminate coverage altogether. Thus, a
lack of additional insured status would never reach WI, as opposed to being
removed from coverage by way of an exclusion under WO. See Hurwitz & Fine,
P.C., Coverage Pointers - Volume IX, No. 24 (May 29, 2008),
https://www.hurwitzfine.com/news/coverage-pointers-volume-ix-no-24.
34. Galganski et al., supra note 13, at 7; see also Maniloff, supra note 22, at
M.23-6 (“[I]f an additional insured is [alleged to have been] contributorily
negligent in conjunction with certain parties, but none of which are the named
insured, then the policy provision requiring that injury or damage be caused in
part by the named insured (or one acting on its behalf) would not appear to be
satisfied.”).
35. See Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Ins.
Co., No. Civ. H-06-0004, 2006 WL 1441854, at *6 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2006); see
also Bruce Smith, Insurance Coverage for Construction Projects, NEB. LAW., April
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Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Crum & Forster Specialty
Insurance Co.,36 the general contractor for a residential
construction
project,
Finger
Companies
(Finger),
subcontracted the framing work for the project to Multi
Building Inc. (Multi).37 As part of their contract, Multi
agreed to obtain a CGL policy naming Finger as an
additional insured.38 Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance
Company (Crum) issued Multi a policy of insurance naming
as an additional insured “persons or organizations as
required by written contract [with Multi].”39 The inclusion of
“as required by written contract” language is common
practice for CGL policies that are issued in the construction
industry, making it possible for a single policy of insurance
to encompass multiple construction contracts and projects
efficiently, without the need to modify or reissue insurance
policies for each.
Unfortunately, the residential construction project was
not without its share of tragedy. In September 2004, Jose
Ricardo Romero was killed and Angel Martinez was injured
when they fell from a makeshift aerial lift comprised of a
“trash box” affixed to a forklift.40 Suit was filed by Romero’s
spouse and children in the Southern District of Texas. 41
Subsequently, Romero’s spouse and children amended their
Petition to allege that both Finger and Multi were
negligent.42 The outcome of two opposing motions for
2006, at 16, 20 (noting that as of April 2006, no case law had yet interpreted the
“caused, in whole or in part, by” endorsement revisions).
36. 2006 WL 1441854 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2006).
37. Id. at *1.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at *2.
42. Id. I note that in this case the Crum policy included the ISO’s CG 20 10
01 04 that clearly establishes “[t]here is no coverage for the additional insured
for ‘bodily injury’ . . . arising out of the sole negligence of the additional insured
or by those acting on behalf of the additional insured.” See American Empire’s
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summary judgment rested on the meaning of the phrase
“whole or in part” included in the additional insured
endorsement of the Crum policy.43 Thus, the district court
was presented with a question as to whether the “whole or in
part” language obligated Crum to provide a defense for
Finger following the plaintiff’s filing of the First Amended
Petition.44
The Southern District of Texas was unpersuaded by
Crum’s interpretation of the endorsement as requiring
vicarious or derivative liability prior to the extension of
additional insured status to Finger.45 A reasonable
interpretation of the language as written indicated that
additional insured coverage should be afforded where Finger
and Multi were found jointly liable or negligent.46 The
absence of the terms “derivative” or “vicarious” meant that
the liability to which the additional insured endorsement
applied was based entirely upon the conduct of the named
Memorandum of Law, Am. Empire, 2006 WL 1441854 app. at 85 (No. 4:06-cv00004). As the court correctly points out, the “sole negligence” provision is
inapplicable where the allegations in a petition suggest multiple negligent
parties throughout its various theories of negligence. Am. Empire, 2006 WL
1441854, at *4 n. 6; see also, Maniloff, supra note 22, at M.23-6 (“An interesting
footnote to form CG 20 10 07 04 is what it does not state. Form CG 20 10 06 04,
a predecessor to form CG 20 10 07 04, was filed by ISO and then quickly
withdrawn. The 06 04 version of form CG 20 10 included the following additional
language: ‘There is no coverage for the additional insured for “bodily injury,”
“property damage” or “personal and advertising injury” arising out of the sole
negligence of the additional insured or by those acting on behalf of the additional
insured.’ Thus, for coverage geneticists, the 06 04 thousand dollar question is
what gave ISO a problem with including this language in its final revision to form
CG 20 10 10 01. This writer has a few ideas. However, there is enough to be said
about the policy language that was ultimately adopted without spending time
discussing the contents of ISO’s cutting room floor.” (citing Revisions to
Additional Insured Endorsements, ISO COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY FORMS
FILING GL-2004-OFGLA, at 3 (2004))).
43. Am. Empire, 2006 WL 1441854, at *4.
44. Id. at *6.
45. Id. at *6–7.
46. Id. at *7 & n.13 (adopting this interpretation and acknowledging in
footnote thirteen the same reasoning used by Gibson & Woodward, supra note
27, at 5–6).
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insured, Multi, and whether or not it was at least partially
responsible for the injuries sustained.47 Because the
allegations in the Petition alleged negligence on the part of
Finger “and/or” Multi, the additional insured endorsement
was triggered, requiring Crum to honor its defense obligation
to Finger.48
Beyond the Southern District of Texas 2006 decision in
American Empire, the trend of various courts across the
country has been to restrict independent coverage of
additional insureds.49 Subsequent to 2006, the language
“caused, in whole or in part, by” has
typically [been] interpreted to restrict coverage for additional
insureds to situations in which the injury was caused, at least in
part, by the primary policyholder. For example, courts in
Pennsylvania, Texas, Maine, Maryland, North Carolina, and New
Hampshire have held that the “caused by” language in an ISOtemplate insurance policy necessitates liability on the part of the
primary policyholder in order to trigger coverage for the additional
insured.50

47. Id. But see John Liner Organization, supra note 28, at 4 (stating that
“[t]he revised ISO endorsements do not mention ‘vicarious liability,’ but the
intent is to limit coverage to the additional insured’s exposure to vicarious
liability and liability from contributory negligence. Some insurers have taken this
one step further, covering an additional insured only for its vicarious liability.”).
48. Am. Empire, 2006 WL 1441854, at *7–8. Interestingly, the Petition in this
case explicitly alleges that the acts or omissions of Finger “and/or” Multi “taken
separately and/or collectively, singularly and/or cumulatively, constitute a direct
and proximate cause of [Romero’s] death.” American Empire’s Memorandum of
Law, supra note 42, at 219. Since the time of this decision, courts have required
the establishment of proximate cause before coverage is afforded under an
additional insured endorsement containing the exact same “caused, in whole or
in part, by” language. See discussion infra Part II.
49. Gary Thompson & Elizabeth Leavy, Your Contract Requires You To Be
Named as an Additional Insured: Are You?, LEXOLOGY (June 13, 2017),
https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2017/06/articles/governm
ent-contracts/your-contract-requires-you-to-be-named-as-an-additional-insuredare-you/.
50. Id.
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II. ADDITIONAL INSURED STATUS IN THE
VACUUM OF NON-LIABILITY
There are benefits to exploring questions of critical
importance in a controlled environment. However, such
exploration has its limits. Probably the most important of all
limitations involves the unlikelihood of arriving within such
a controlled environment in actual practice. And this
unlikelihood tends to raise more questions than answers
regarding the application of the resulting precedent.
This Part introduces the crux of the incursion of
Palsgraf-ian proximate cause from tort law to the world of
insurance coverage litigation. The “vacuum of non-liability”
created in light of a faultless named insured gives rise to the
heart of my thesis. Although this Part will show how
simplistic the application of Palsgraf-ian proximate cause is
where the named insured was not even minimally at fault, it
is this faultless environment that has catalyzed the
implementation of this tort concept in the insurance context
in the first place and has led primarily to this discussion
regarding just how far the concept can be extended.
Many of the construction industry lawsuits in New York
State occur within Manhattan and the Bronx, where jobrelated accidents are frequently litigated in New York’s First
Department.51 The questions that arise in construction
accident litigation are rarely limited to what adequate
compensation for an injury will be. Rather, the question is
usually what combination of entities will be responsible for
paying such sum upon a finding that compensation is
warranted. In the world of construction litigation, with the
layering of contracts and parties, variables such as liability
are rarely certain—except when they are. A recent New York
case, Burlington Insurance Co. v. NYC Transit Authority,52
sheds some interesting light on exactly how the ISO’s
“caused, in whole or in part, by” language should be
51. Kohane & Ehman, supra note 12, at 930.
52. 79 N.E.3d 477 (N.Y. 2017).
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interpreted for providing coverage to an additional insured.
However, it simultaneously raises additional questions.
Prior to the New York State Court of Appeals’
interpretation in Burlington, New York’s First Department
had interpreted identical additional insured endorsements
in a series of cases, determining that
an insurer who agreed to provide additional insured protection was
obligated to afford such coverage, irrespective of the named
insured’s negligence, so long as there was some tangential
relationship between the work performed by the named insured and
the accident that led to the lawsuit. That was the case even though
the additional insured endorsements provided that coverage would
only be provided if the accident was “caused in whole or in part” by
the acts or omissions of the named insured.53

Generally, in pre-Burlington New York construction law
cases, “if [a] subcontractor was involved with [a] loss in a
more tenuous way, there was a general understanding that
[additional
insured]
coverage
would
likely
be
54
triggered . . . .” Owners and general contractors relied upon
the adequacy of coverage provided by the “downstream”
subcontractor’s insurer, and subcontractors merely relayed
the level of coverage required contractually in its “upstream”
agreements to its insurer.

53. Kohane & Ehman, supra note 12, at 930 (footnote omitted); see also Nova
Cas. v. Harleysville Worchester Ins. Co., 50 N.Y.S.3d 1, 1–2 (App. Div. 2017)
(“Harleysville is obligated to provide a defense and indemnity for [the additional
insured], even if Coastal is ultimately found to have no liability in the underlying
action.”); Aspen Specialty Ins. Co. v. Ironshore Indem. Inc., 42 N.Y.S.3d 121, 122
(App. Div. 2016) (“While the policy issued by Ironshore to [the named insured]
refers, with respect to coverage for additional insureds, to ‘losses “caused by” [the
named insured’s] “acts or omissions” or “operations,” the existence of coverage
does not depend upon a showing that [the named insured’s] causal conduct was
negligent or otherwise at fault.”); Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Auth., 14
N.Y.S.3d 377, 384 (App. Div. 2015) (“The loss . . . resulted, at least in part, from
‘the acts or omissions’ of the [named insured] . . ., regardless of whether the
[named insured] was negligent or otherwise at fault for his mishap.” (quoting KelMar Designs, Inc. v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 8 N.Y.S.3d 304 (App. Div.
2015))).
54. Sistrunk, supra note 29 (third alteration in original) (quoting Suzanne
Whitehead, Senior Associate at Zelle McDonough & Cohen LLP).
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That all changed when Burlington reached the New York
State Court of Appeals. On one particularly unfortunate
Valentine’s Day in 2009, an employee of the New York City
Transit Authority (NYCTA), Thomas Kenny, attempted to
avoid an explosion and fell from an elevated bench wall.55 At
the time, Kenny had been working around the active
excavation of a subway tunnel near the Nostrand Avenue
Subway Station in Brooklyn, New York.56 The explosion
occurred when an excavation machine operated by Breaking
Solutions, Inc. (Breaking) struck a live electrical wire that
was embedded in concrete.57 At all relevant times
surrounding the accident, NYCTA was leasing the premises
from the City of New York, and had contracted with
Breaking to perform demolition work in the subway
tunnels.58
Following his fall, Thomas Kenny and his wife, Patricia,
sued the City of New York and Breaking, seeking
compensation for his injuries.59 However, in February 2011,
Breaking filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that Breaking
bore “no liability for [Kenny’s] accident whatsoever” and that

55. Burlington, 79 N.E.3d at 479.
56. Id.; Complaint at 2–3, Kenny v. City of New York, 2011 WL 4460598
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 09-cv-1422) [hereinafter Kenny Complaint].
57. Burlington, 79 N.E.3d at 479.
58. Kenny, 2011 WL 4460598, at *1.
59. Id. For a description of the types of injuries (and their extent) which one
may experience at a construction site, see Kenny Complaint, supra note 56, at 4
(“[P]laintiff . . . sustained injuries to his limbs and body, and injuries to his
nervous system, and other systems of his body, shock to his nervous system,
anxiety, stress, and suffering; has suffered, suffers and will suffer physical pain,
mental anguish, and the loss of the enjoyment of the pursuits and pleasures of
life, disruption of the activities of daily living, and other personal injuries; some
of which are and will be permanent in nature; that plaintiff has received, receives
and will receive medical, surgical, hospital and health care treatment and care,
and has and will incur expenses for medical, surgical, hospital, and health care
providers and health care treatment; and has been, is and will be confined to
hospital, bed and/or home as a result thereof; plaintiff has lost, and will lose time
from employment, employment earnings, and/or employment perquisites; all to
his damage, in a sum, . . . however, not exceeding $10,000,000.00.”).
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“[t]he true culprit [was] third-party defendant, [NYCTA].” 60
Breaking’s letter indicated that NYCTA had conducted an
undisputed accident investigation, revealing that during
NYCTA’s “pre-work inspection of the subject work area,
NYCTA failed to identify and/or mark-off the subject power
cables.”61 Moreover, “during [its] pre-work walk-through, the
NYCTA failed to use electrical detection equipment to locate
buried power cables. Furthermore, . . . the power cables were
improperly installed by NYCTA and were not included in any
power/electrical schematics maintained by NYCTA.”62 A
separate report prepared by NYCTA indicated that Breaking
was “operating the equipment properly and had no way of
knowing that the cables were submerged in the [concrete]
invert.”63 In response, the Kennys moved to discontinue the
action against Breaking, and the court dismissed the action
against Breaking with prejudice by way of stipulation. 64
Accordingly, both the City of New York and Breaking
Solutions, Inc. stipulated to withdraw their cross-claims
against one another, which were each subsequently
dismissed by the court.65
Breaking was afforded reprieve in the underlying action,
but as with the bulk of insurance litigation, found its insurer,
Burlington Insurance Company (Burlington), dragged into
subsequent litigation regarding who would be financially
responsible for Mr. Kenny’s injuries.66 Breaking, in
accordance
with
NYCTA’s
contractual
insurance
requirements, purchased a CGL insurance policy from
60. Breaking Solutions, Inc. Motion to Dismiss at 1, Kenny, 2011 WL 4460598
(No. 09-cv-1422).
61. Id. at 2.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Kenny, 2011 WL 4460598, at *4; see also Plaintiff Motion for
Discontinuance at 1, Kenny, 2011 WL 4460598 (No. 09-cv-1422).
65. Kenny, 2011 WL 4460598, at *1 n.1, *4.
66. See Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Auth., 79 N.E.3d 477, 478 (N.Y.
2017).
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Burlington that included NYCTA and the City of New York
as additional insureds under certain conditions.67 As agreed
to by NYCTA and Breaking, the Burlington policy included
endorsement language from the latest form issued by the
ISO, providing that NYCTA and the City of New York were
additional insureds:
only with respect to liability for “bodily injury”, “property damage”
or “personal and advertising injury” caused, in whole or in part, by:
1. Your acts or omissions; or
2. The acts or omissions of those acting on your behalf.68

The City of New York, following Thomas Kenny’s filing
of suit, impleaded NYCTA in the underlying action,
asserting third-party indemnification and contribution
claims pursuant to their lease agreement.69 NYCTA
tendered its defense to Burlington, asserting that it was an
additional insured under the CGL policy issued to
Breaking.70 Burlington accepted the defense, but reserved its
rights to withdraw should NYCTA fail to qualify as an
additional insured.71
As stated above, discovery in the underlying lawsuit
revealed that it was NYCTA’s failure “to identify, mark, or
protect the electric cable” that ultimately led to the
employee’s injuries.72 The stipulation leading to the
dismissal of Kenny’s lawsuit against Breaking with prejudice
prompted Burlington’s disclaimer of coverage for NYCTA,
asserting that without fault on behalf of its named insured,
Breaking, NYCTA was not an additional insured under the

67. Id. at 479.
68. Id.
69. Id. (“Under article VI, § 6.8 of that lease agreement, NYCTA agreed to
indemnify the City for liability ‘arising out of or in connection with the operation,
management[,] and control by the [NYCTA]’ of the leased property.”).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 479–80.
72. Id. at 480.
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policy.73 In other words, “Burlington denied coverage to
NYCTA . . . on the grounds that [it] w[as] not [an] additional
insured[] within the meaning of the policy because NYCTA
was solely responsible for the accident that caused the
injury.”74 Regardless of such findings, under previous
iterations of the ISO’s additional insured endorsements, such
fault would be irrelevant, as the incident had occurred within
the course of Breaking’s ongoing operations for the NYCTA
project. However, this was not your father’s CGL policy,75 but
rather the most recent iteration which included the “caused,
in whole or in part, by” terminology.
In this significant New York insurance decision,
Burlington commenced a declaratory judgment action
against NYCTA, seeking a judicial determination that
NYCTA was not owed coverage as an additional insured
under the CGL policy issued to Breaking.76 The New York
State Supreme Court granted Burlington’s motion for
summary judgment, agreeing that NYCTA could not be an
additional insured unless the named insured, Breaking, was
negligent.77 The New York State Appellate Division, First
Department, reversed, concluding that “the named insured
was not negligent, but ‘the act of triggering the
explosion . . . was a cause of [the employee’s] injury’ within
the meaning of the policy.”78 The New York State Court of
Appeals granted Burlington leave to appeal.79

73. Id.
74. Id. at 478–79.
75. This pays homage to Oldsmobile’s (in)famous ad slogan “not your father’s
Oldsmobile.” Coincidentally, the year 2004 marked the end for both General
Motors’ Oldsmobile and the ISO’s “arising out of” version of additional insured
endorsement.
76. Burlington, 79 N.E.3d at 480.
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Auth., 14 N.Y.S.3d 377,
382 (App. Div. 2015).
79. Id.; see also Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Auth., 56 N.E.3d 898 (N.Y.
2016) (granting leave to appeal).
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Burlington maintained that “under the plain meaning of
the endorsement NYCTA . . . [is] not [an] additional
insured[] because the acts or omissions of the named insured,
[Breaking], were not a proximate cause of the injury” and
thus “the coverage does not apply where, as here, the
additional insured was the sole proximate cause of the
injury.”80 In opposition, NYCTA asserted that the express
terms of the endorsement applied to “any act or omission by
[Breaking] that resulted in injury, regardless of the
additional insured’s negligence” and “that [Breaking’s]
operation of its excavation machine provided the requisite
causal nexus between injury and act to trigger coverage
under the policy.”81
The Court of Appeals at length dissected the differences
between “but for” causation, or causation in fact, and
“proximate” or “legal” cause.82 Where “but for” causation is
“[t]he cause without which the event could not have
occurred,”83 liability only extends as far as it is assigned by
the Court, and “because of convenience, . . . public policy,
[and] a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to
trace a series of events beyond [its proximate cause].”84
Interestingly, the New York Court of Appeals used
proximate cause language from Palsgraf v. Long Is. Railroad
Co.85 This “Palsgraf-ian” style proximate cause, famously
included in the dissenting opinion of Justice Andrews, legally
severs the chain of liability without regard to the possibility

80. Burlington, 79 N.E.3d at 480–81.
81. Id. at 481 (emphasis in original).
82. Id.
83. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting But-For Cause, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
84. Id. (citing Ventricelli v. Kinney Sys. Rent A Car, 383 N.E.2d 1149, 1149–
50 (N.Y. 1978) (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y.
1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting))).
85. Id.
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of an actual causal connection or actual fault.86 In theory,
such an application of “Palsgraf-ian” proximate cause in the
context of additional insured coverage may allow for the
possibility of the elimination of coverage where the named
insured is even one-percent at fault.87
Continuing on these principles, Burlington’s use of the
language “‘caused, in whole or in part’ [by Breaking]” in the
policy endorsement required the Court to distinguish
between mere “but-for” causes and the “proximate,” legal
cause of the injuries sustained, “since ‘but for’ causation
cannot be partial.”88 The Court determined that the “words—
‘in whole or in part’—can only modify ‘proximate cause.’”89
Moreover, with Burlington’s use of the term “liability,” that
requires a showing of fault, the Court of Appeals concluded
that if additional insured coverage is afforded “only with
respect to liability,” then the language “caused, in whole or
in part, by” restricts such coverage to damage caused by the
negligent or otherwise actionable “acts or omissions” of

86. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews,
J., dissenting).
87. See Peter N. Swisher, Causation Requirements in Tort and Insurance Law
Practice: Demystifying Some Legal Causation “Riddles”, 43 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 1, 34 (2007). However, in practice, such a legal determination that
would allow for the denial of coverage on behalf of any insured is asking a lot,
given the public policy concerns of compensating the injured and rejecting
unnecessary forfeiture of coverage. I stress that such a determination would need
to be made under the right factual scenario, and caution that in selecting just
such a scenario, one must remember the old adage that “bad facts make bad law.”
This is especially true in an insurance industry and context that is, at its core,
concerned with the predictability of the happening of covered risks.
88. Burlington, 79 N.E.3d at 482.
89. Id. But cf. Sistrunk, supra note 29 (“Attorneys who represent
policyholders said the majority’s decision to interpret the additional insured
endorsement as requiring a proximate cause standard, even though those exact
words don’t appear in the provision, marks a departure from well-established
policy interpretation principles. . . . ‘For the court to put “proximately” in there,
it added a word to a contract that was already written and, not only that, it is a
word with great legal significance,’ said Anderson Kill PC shareholder Allen R.
Wolff.”).
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Breaking.90 Applying the facts at issue to these causation
principles, the Court held that
[Breaking] was not at fault. The employee’s injury was due to
NYCTA’s sole negligence in failing to identify, mark, or deenergize
the cable. Although but for [Breaking’s] machine coming into
contact with the live cable, the explosion would not have occurred
and the employee would not have fallen or been injured, that
triggering act was not the proximate cause of the employee’s
injuries since [Breaking] was not at fault in operating the machine
in the manner that led it to touch the live cable.91

Without fault on behalf of the named insured, Breaking,
the Court of Appeals reversed the First Department and
granted Burlington’s motion for summary judgment,
agreeing that the insurer did not owe NYCTA coverage as an
additional insured under the policy.92
The holding in Burlington was indeed consistent with
the goal of the ISO to eliminate a fault-free interpretation of
coverage.93 Following the Court of Appeals decision in
Burlington, it was anticipated by those involved in insurance
litigation that construction contracting and insurance in the
state of New York would be significantly impacted. As a
90. Burlington, 79 N.E.3d at 482. But see id. at 483 (agreeing with the dissent
that the language “caused . . . by” does not necessitate negligence on behalf of the
named insured before additional insured coverage is to be afforded).
Interestingly, the Court of Appeals neglected to decide that “negligence” must be
found on behalf of the named insured. Some commentators have suggested that
the ISO’s lack of use of the term “negligence” in relation to the “acts or omissions”
that must give rise to liability may have been on purpose, so as to prevent the
exclusion of “intentional” acts giving rise to liability and fault on behalf of the
named insured. DONALD S. MALECKI ET AL., THE ADDITIONAL INSURED BOOK 200
n.2 (6th ed. 2011) (“The reference to acts rather than negligent acts of the named
insured is necessary because endorsement CG 20 10 applies to personal and
advertising injury as well as bodily injury and property damage. Personal and
advertising injury offenses may constitute volitional or intentional conduct where
no negligence is involved. For the same reason, coverage exists for the additional
insured with respect to bodily injury and property damage, even if that injury or
damage results from the named insured’s intentional (rather than negligent)
act.”).
91. Burlington, 79 N.E.3d at 484.
92. Id. at 485–86.
93. BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 21, § 11:338.
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result of the decision, “[l]arge general contractors or owners
that thought they were getting additional insured coverage
for their own fault under this endorsement are no longer
going to get that in New York,” and instead, “there is only
[additional insured] coverage if the downstream
subcontractor is actually at fault.”94 Many of those
“upstream” in this new, post-Burlington, reality have
considered adjusting contracted insurance requirements to
explicitly provide the broadly interpreted “arising out of”
language of additional insured coverage afforded in the ISO’s
10 01 form that had allowed for mere “but for” causal
connection arising under the ongoing operations of the
“downstream” subcontractor.95
Under the same “caused, in whole or in part, by”
language, other courts have confronted questions similar to
those faced by the New York Court of Appeals in Burlington.
But again, how frequently is the issue of liability readily
eliminated for the named insured at the outset of litigation
following a construction accident and lawsuit? Interestingly,
the Superior Court of Massachusetts in Leahy v. Lighthouse
Masonry, Inc.96 confronted a very similar scenario to that in
Burlington, where all liability for the named insured had
been ruled out, and the court was left to interpret “caused, in
whole or in part, by” language in a vacuum.
In Leahy, an employee of General Mechanical
Contractors, Inc. (GMC), Vincent Leahy, was seriously
injured by a large limestone panel that fell off a building. 97
The general contractor for the construction project, Daniel

94. Sistrunk, supra note 29 (quoting David Wood, partner at Barnes &
Throngburg LLP).
95. Julian D. Ehrlich, Reaction and Overreaction to ‘Burlington v. NYC
Transit Auth.’, N.Y.L.J. (Feb. 27, 2018, 02:30 PM), https://www.law.com
/newyorklawjournal/2018/02/27/reaction-and-overreaction-to-burlington-v-nyctransit-auth/.
96. No. MICV201100151, 2014 WL 7405931 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 2, 2014).
97. Id. at *1. All parties involved no doubt found themselves between the
proverbial rock and a hard place.
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O’Connell’s Sons, Inc. (O’Connell), had contracted with GMC
to install the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning on
site.98 The contract required GMC to obtain a CGL policy
that named O’Connell as an additional insured, and GMC
obtained such a policy from Peerless Insurance Company
(Peerless).99
Lighthouse Masonry, Inc. (Lighthouse), another
subcontractor, was responsible for installing limestone
panels on the exterior wall of the building.100 While Mr.
Leahy was on break below, a Lighthouse foreman
accidentally dislodged a limestone panel installed days
earlier, which subsequently fell and seriously injured Mr.
Leahy.101 O’Connell’s site superintendent had personally
walked through the area of the accident two or three times
that morning and believed that it was a safe place for
employees to take their break since no overhead work was
being performed there.102 The undisputed facts of the case
show that Mr. Leahy’s injuries were caused by Lighthouse,
or at the very least not by GMC.103 Lighthouse ultimately
settled claims covered by its CGL and excess liability
insurers for $7,250,000. 104
The Peerless CGL policy provided that additional
insured coverage should be afforded to “O’Connell for any
liability that is ‘caused, in whole or in part, by . . . acts or
omissions’ of GMC.”105 The court acknowledged that the
phrase “caused by” in an insurance policy “embodies the
concept of proximate causation.”106 In the insurance context,
98. Id. at *3.
99. Id. at *5.
100. Id. at *3.
101. Id. at *4.
102. Id. at *3.
103. Id. at *8.
104. Id. at *4.
105. Id. at *8.
106. Id.; see also United Nat’l Ins. v. Parish, 717 N.E.2d 1016, 1018 (Mass. App.
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the court explained,
[w]hen an insurance policy covers and indemnifies an insured for
losses “caused by” a certain category of events, the scope of coverage
must be determined based on whether “the efficient proximate
cause of the loss” is within that category of events. Under such an
insurance provision, a loss is “caused by” the event “that sets in
motion a train of events which brings about a result without the
intervention of any force stated and working actively from a new
and independent source,” which in legal jargon we call “the direct
and proximate cause” of the loss. “Remote causes of causes are not
relevant to the characterization of an insurance loss. In the context
of this commercial litigation, the causation inquiry stops at the
efficient physical cause of the loss; it does not trace events back to
their metaphysical beginnings.”107

Since it was undisputed that Mr. Leahy’s injuries were
caused by the acts or omissions of Lighthouse, rather than
GMC, the court held that Peerless had no obligation to
indemnify under either its CGL policy or umbrella liability
policy, where the umbrella liability policy was wholly
contingent upon the existence of CGL coverage.108
III. “CAUSED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY” AND THE BROAD
DUTY TO DEFEND
In both Burlington and Leahy, the determination of
liability for the named insured had been made prior to any
need for the courts to analyze the insurer’s duty to indemnify
any potential additional insureds under the policy, because
no entity qualified without fault on behalf of the named
insured. Since the insurer’s duty to indemnify was clearly
non-existent for the general contractor and property owner,
the insurer was also not required to provide any defense for
litigation, simply because they were not insured under the
policy. But outside of such “controlled environment”
litigation, where the named insured is even one-percent at

Div. 1999) (determining that “arising out of” has a broader meaning than “caused
by”).
107. Leahy, 2014 WL 7405931 at *8 (citations omitted).
108. Id.
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fault, how should courts handle an insurer’s broad duty to
defend?
In this Part, practitioners are reminded to evaluate
coverage disputes responsibly. For every evaluation of an
insurer’s duty to indemnify, it is necessary to evaluate an
insurer’s duty to defend. The limitations of Palsgraf-ian
proximate cause are further clouded by the breadth of
disparity between the two.
When purchasing an insurance policy that provides
coverage for certain risks, the insured actually purchases
both “liability insurance” and “litigation insurance.”109 Both
coverages extend to any person or entity that meets the
policy’s definition of an “insured,” including an additional
insured.110 Generally, the duty of an insurer to pay for the
defense costs of its insured is broader than any obligation
that the insurer may have to indemnify that insured.111 It is
well understood in insurance litigation that courts look to the
allegations levied against an insured in making a
determination regarding the insurer’s duty to defend. 112
Specifically, “[t]he duty to defend is measured against the
allegations of pleadings but the duty to pay is determined by
109. See Auto. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Cook, 850 N.E.2d 1152, 1155 (N.Y. 2006);
Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Gillette Co., 476 N.E.2d 272, 274–75 (N.Y. 1984); Int’l Paper
Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 320 N.E.2d 619, 621 (N.Y. 1974) (“While policy coverage . . .
is often referred to as ‘liability insurance’ it is clear that it is, in fact, ‘litigation
insurance’ as well.”).
110. PLITT ET AL., supra note 15, § 40:29.
111. Goldberg v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 77 N.E.2d 131, 133 (N.Y. 1948)
(“[E]ven in cases where the policies do not render the allegations by the injured
party controlling, it has been said: ‘The distinction between liability and coverage
must be kept in mind. So far as concerns the obligation of the insurer to defend
the question is not whether the injured party can maintain a cause of action
against the insured but whether he can state facts which bring the injury within
the coverage. If he states such facts the policy requires the insurer to defend
irrespective of the insured’s ultimate liability.’”).
112. Prashker v. U.S. Guarantee Co., 136 N.E.2d 871, 875 (N.Y. 1956) (“The
circumstance that some grounds are alleged in the complaints in the negligence
actions which would involve the insurance company in liability is enough to call
upon it to defend these actions.”); see also Doyle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 136 N.E.2d
484, 486–87 (N.Y. 1956).
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the actual basis for the insured’s liability to a third
person.”113 This defense obligation encompasses allegations
no matter how “groundless, false or fraudulent.”114 Because
of these vastly different thresholds to the defense and
indemnity obligations, a court would relieve an insurer of its
duty to defend “only if it could be concluded as a matter of
law that there [was] no possible factual or legal basis on
which [the insurer] might eventually be held to be obligated
to indemnify . . . under any provision of the insurance
policy . . . .”115 An example pertinent to our analysis would be
a finding that an entity was neither a named, nor additional
insured under the policy, whereby no coverage or indemnity
obligation would exist under the policy as a matter of law.116
Although cases like Burlington, Leahy and their kin

113. Servidone Constr. Corp. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 477 N.E.2d 441, 444
(N.Y. 1985).
114. BP Air Conditioning Corp. v. OneBeacon Ins. Grp., 871 N.E.2d 1128, 1132
(N.Y. 2007) (quoting Servidone Constr. Corp., 477 N.E.2d at 444); see also James
G. Davis Constr. Corp. v. Erie Ins. Exch., 126 A.3d 753, 762 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2015) (“[T]he underlying tort suit need only allege action that is potentially
covered by the policy, no matter how attenuated, frivolous, or illogical that
allegation may be.”).
115. Spoor-Lasher Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 352 N.E.2d 139, 140 (N.Y.
1976); see also MATHIAS ET AL., supra note 21, § 8.01 (“By definition, an insurer
need indemnify its policyholder only for those claims that actually are covered by
the policy. In contrast, any action asserting claims that may potentially fall
within the coverage of the policy gives rise to the duty to defend. The same
standard for determining the duty to defend applies to additional insureds as to
the primary named insured.” (first emphasis added)).
116. See, e.g., Worth Constr. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 888 N.E.2d 1043, 1045–
46 (N.Y. 2008) (declining to afford a general contractor additional insured status
under a subcontractor’s insurance policy where the injured party conceded claims
of negligence against the subcontractor were without factual merit); see also
MATHIAS ET AL., supra note 21, § 8.01 (“If an insurer can show that there clearly
would be no coverage for the ultimate liability, or that the claim is subject to a
clear policy exclusion, no duty to defend exists.”); Alan J. Pierce, Insurance Law,
59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 887, 891 (2009) (“[A]dditional insured coverage does not
extend to circumstances where the additional insured concedes, or it has been
determined that the named insured was not negligent and the named insured is
not on the work site at the time of the injury.”). Although Worth involved the pre2004 ISO language “arising out of,” it establishes that without insured status of
some kind, there is no defense obligation.
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appear to convey a definitive rule for interpreting the
language “caused, in whole or in part, by,” they fail to
address how courts apply proximate cause where liability is
less certain. On the opposite extreme, where courts have
been asked to determine whether an insurer must defend an
entity under an additional insured endorsement and the
named insured’s liability remains uncertain, courts are often
reluctant to eliminate an insurer’s broad defense
obligation.117
In Pro Con, Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., a
construction company, Pro Con, Inc. (Pro Con), was the
general contractor for the construction of a college hockey
rink.118 After subcontracting with Canatal Industries Inc.
(Canatal) for structural steel work, Canatal, in turn,
subcontracted with CCS Constructors, LLC (CCS) for the
actual steel erection.119 Pursuant to the terms of the contract
between the subcontractors, CCS was required to (and
ultimately did) procure a CGL policy from Interstate Fire
and Casualty Company (Interstate) under which Canatal,
Pro Con, and Bowdoin College were named as additional

117. See First Mercury Ins. Co. v. Shawmut Woodworking & Supply, Inc., 48
F. Supp. 3d 158 (D. Conn. 2014); Pro Con, Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 794
F. Supp. 2d 242 (D. Me. 2011); Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Empire Steel Erectors, No.
H-08-1707, 2010 WL 4791493, at *6–7 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2010); see also Maniloff,
supra note 22, at M.23-8 (“As a result of a sue-first-and-gather-the-facts-later
pleading strategy, the underlying plaintiff’s suit is likely to name several
potentially negligent parties, in addition to the actually negligent party (the
additional insured). Thus, even if it is ultimately determined that the additional
insured was solely responsible for the injuries, or contributorily negligent—but
not in conjunction with the named insured, the additional insured will likely
secure a defense. This will likely be accomplished by the additional insured citing
the duty to defend standard and pointing to the allegations in the underlying
complaint that the plaintiff’s injury was caused in whole or in part by the named
insured’s acts or omissions, or of those acting on its behalf, as required by form
CG 20 10 07 04. And as insurers know all too well—especially those involved in
construction losses—the duty to defend is frequently far more costly than the
duty to indemnify.”).
118. Pro Con, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 245.
119. Id.
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insureds.120
In the dead of winter, a CCS crane operator, Stephen E.
Williams, fell and was injured after he slipped on snowcovered plastic insulating blankets installed by Pro Con at
the Bowdoin College construction site.121 Although the
accident occurred in the course of Mr. Williams’ work for
CCS, Pro Con may have been advised prior to his fall that
frost blankets were dangerous.122 Mr. Williams filed suit
against Pro Con, alleging negligent failure to maintain
reasonably safe working conditions on site.123 Pro Con
responded by alleging Mr. Williams was comparatively
negligent, filing a third-party action against Canatal for
contractual and common law indemnity, and filing a fourthparty suit against CCS alleging that CCS was obligated to
indemnify Canatal.124
Subsequently,
Pro
Con’s
insurer,
American
International Group, Inc. (AIG) tendered Pro Con’s defense
and indemnity to CCS and its insurer, Interstate, 125 which
was rejected.126 Interstate’s investigation indicated that
120. Id. at 245–46.
121. Id. at 248.
122. See id. (“Following Williams’ accident, on December 10, 2007, Terry
Carpenter, CCS’s superintendent on the Bowdoin Project, sent Pro Con a letter
reiterating what he characterized as a prior request that the frost blankets
covering the building perimeter in CCS’s work area be removed in order to
prevent further injuries.” (emphasis added)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 248–49; see also Blecker Aff. Ex. B, Pro Con, 794 F. Supp. 2d 242
(No. 21-3) (tendering Pro Con’s defense and indemnity to Interstate via certified
letter). As an aside, AIG’s tender letter on behalf of Pro Con solely relies upon
Mr. Williams’ employment by CCS as the basis for the assertion that “the incident
arose out of CCS’ work.” Id. However, the language “arising out of” in the ISO’s
standard additional insured endorsement was modified to “caused, in whole or in
part, by” in 2004 specifically to create more stringent standards of causation that
must apply before coverage is afforded under a policy. Maniloff, supra note 22, at
M.23-5; see also discussion infra Part IV (regarding Pioneer Cent. Sch. Dist. v.
Preferred Mut. Ins. Co.).
126. Pro Con, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 249; see also Blecker Aff. Ex. F, Pro Con, 794
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Mr. Williams slipped and fell while exiting the crane he was
operating. The fall was due to the fact that Pro Con had placed, or
requested to be placed, insulated blanket ground cover around the
job site work area which was then covered with snow. This created
the slippery condition that was the cause of the accident.127

Thus, relying upon its investigation, Interstate rejected
the tender because the accident was confirmed not to have
been “caused in whole or in part by” the CCS’s acts or
omissions.128
In assessing whether Interstate had a duty to defend Pro
Con, the District of Maine interpreted the policy’s additional
insured endorsement as “plainly requir[ing] that there be
some connection between the operations on behalf of the
Additional Insured (i.e., Pro Con) and the Named Insured
(i.e., CCS).”129 Relying on this interpretation and reviewing
the language in the underlying complaint, the court
determined that Mr. Williams “was performing work within
the scope and course of his employment with CCS when he
was injured,” and thus Pro Con’s potential for liability arose
out of CCS’s operations.130 Combined with the fact that the
complaint was void of reference to Pro Con’s installation of
the tarps, the court held that “[f]rom these allegations,
there . . . is certainly the potential that . . . the fact finder
[might] determin[e] that Williams’ bodily injuries were
caused, at least in part by, the acts or omissions of CCS (or
its agents) in the performance of these operations.”131
F. Supp. 2d 242 (No. 21-7) (notifying AIG via certified letter of Interstate’s
rejection of AIG’s tender of defense and indemnity on behalf of Pro Con).
127. Blecker Aff. Ex. F, supra note 126, at 1.
128. Pro Con, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 249; see also Blecker Aff. Ex. F, supra note
126, at 2.
129. Pro Con, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 254. But see Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Mo.
Highways & Transp. Comm’n, No. 4:12-CV-01484-NKL, 2014 WL 4594207, at
*12 (W.D. Mo. 2014) (acknowledging that the use of “caused by” language in an
endorsement requires more than the establishment of a “simple causal
relationship” between the injury and the activity of the insured, but rather
something more closely resembling proximate cause in general tort law).
130. Pro Con, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 254.
131. Id. at 257.
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The analysis in Pro Con is but one example of the
problem courts have in interpreting “caused, in whole or in
part, by” language in the context of the broad duty to defend.
Similarly, the District of Connecticut in First Mercury
Insurance Co. v. Shawmut Woodworking & Supply, Inc.132
encountered the application of an additional insured
endorsement to an insurer’s duty to defend. In First Mercury,
the catastrophic collapse of a steel web structure during its
installation at Yale University’s Science Area Chilled Water
Plant Shell caused injuries to several Fast Trek Steel (Fast
Trek) employees, including the death of Robert F. Adrian. 133
The general contractor for the project, Shawmut
Woodworking & Supply, Inc. (Shawmut), had subcontracted
the steel fabrication and construction work to Shepard Steel
Company (Shepard).134 Shepard, in turn, subcontracted the
steel erection portion of work to Fast Trek.135 As required by
contract, Fast Trek obtained a CGL insurance policy from
First Mercury that included both Shawmut and Shepard as
“additional insureds.”136
Following the collapse and injuries, the injured Fast
Trek employees and Mr. Adrian’s estate filed suit against
Shawmut and Shepard, who tendered their defenses to First
Mercury and demanded indemnity pursuant to the
Additional Insured Endorsement in its policy issued to Fast

132. 48 F. Supp. 3d 158 (D. Conn. 2014), aff’d, 660 F. App’x 30 (2d Cir. 2016).
I note the important distinction between the New York Court of Appeals decision
in Burlington, which solely addresses an insurer’s duty to indemnify, and the
First Mercury decision, pertaining only to an insurer’s broad duty to defend.
However, First Mercury provides an interesting discussion of the “caused, in
whole or in part, by” language in relation to both “proximate cause” and “vicarious
liability,” and is included for this purpose.
133. Id. at 160. See generally Egidio DiBenedetto, 1 Dead, 3 Injured in Science
Park Construction Accident, YALE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 14, 2010, 2:18 AM),
https://yaledailynews.com/blog/2010/09/14/1-dead-3-injured-in-science-parkconstruction-accident/ (detailed description of incident).
134. First Mercury, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 160.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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Trek.137 The endorsement in the First Mercury Policy
provides coverage for
any person or organization for whom you are performing operations
when you and such person or organization have agreed in writing
in a contract or agreement that such person or organization be
added as an additional insured on your policy. Such person or
organization is an additional insured only with respect to liability
for “bodily injury”, “property damage” or “personal and advertising
injury” caused, in whole or in part, by
1. Your acts or omissions; or
2. The acts or omissions of those acting on your behalf; in the
performance of your ongoing operations for the additional
insured.138

First Mercury contended, inter alia, that the language
“only with respect to liability for ‘. . . injury’ caused, in whole
or in part, by,” required it to provide a defense to Shawmut
and Shepard “only for instances where vicarious liability is
imputed to [Shawmut and/or Shepard] as a result of acts or
omissions of Fast Trek, apart from their own independent
acts or omissions.”139 However, the district court declined to
add language to First Mercury’s policy endorsement that was
not included in the express language of the policy, refusing
to modify “liability” to “vicarious liability.”140
Moreover, the district court noted that the limitation to
“liability” proposed by First Mercury would fail to give effect
to the phrase “in whole or in part.”141 “Vicarious liability”

137. Id. at 160–61 (“Liberty Mutual is . . . providing a defense to Shepard and
Shawmut under a reservation of rights and has made demand upon First
Mercury to assume that defense, . . . maintaining that First Mercury has a duty
to defend Shawmut and Shepard as additional insureds under the policy issued
by First Mercury.”).
138. Id. at 163–64; see also Liberty Mutual Memorandum of Law in Support of
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. F at 3–4, First Mercury, 48 F. Supp.
3d 158 (No. 3:12-cv-01096) (adopting the 2004 version of the ISO’s standard CGL
Additional Insured Endorsement, CG 20 33 07 04).
139. First Mercury, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 172.
140. See id. at 172–73.
141. Id. at 172.
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would be incompatible with the “caused, in whole or in part,
by” language, because “vicarious liability is an all or nothing
proposition and thus a party could not be vicariously liable
‘in part’ for Fast Trek’s acts.”142 Relying on the District of
Maine’s reasoning in Pro Con, which interpreted identical
endorsement language, the District of Connecticut agreed
that “the insurer, ‘by including the language “in whole or in
part” in [the additional insured provision], specifically
intended coverage for additional insureds to extend to
occurrences attributable in part to acts or omissions by both
the named insured and the additional insured.’”143
The District of Connecticut in First Mercury continued
by addressing the history of modifications to the ISO’s
additional insured endorsement.144 Reacting to a history of
additional insured status extensions to entities for their sole
negligence, the ISO in 2004 replaced the language “arising
out of the named insured’s acts or omissions” in its standard
additional insured endorsement with the language “caused,
in whole or in part, by” the named insured’s acts or
omissions.145 The change to the “caused . . . by” language
eliminated coverage for the sole negligence of an additional
insured, and was interpreted to “require proximate causation
by the insured rather than simply but-for causation.”146
Since “liability” was included in both versions of the
endorsement, it was interpreted to be a factor in the
causation determination, contrary to First Mercury’s
“vicarious liability” contention.147

142. Id. at 173.
143. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pro Con, Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Cas.
Co., 794 F. Supp. 2d 242, 256–57 (D. Me. 2011)).
144. Id. at 173–74.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 174.
147. Id.; see also Royal Indem. Co. v. Terra Firma, Inc., 948 A.2d 1101 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2006) (interpreting “liability” in the same manner, as a piece of the
causation question), aff’d and adopted by 947 A.2d 913 (Conn. 2008).
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The District of Connecticut consulted the Pro Con, Inc.
decision, which had conducted a similar discussion regarding
variations in the exact additional insured endorsement
language utilized and, more specifically, the impact when
“caused, in whole or in part, by” language was included. 148
Whereas the express language included in endorsements
analyzed in the recent past had plainly called for “vicarious
liability”149 or excluding coverage for claims based on the sole
negligence of the additional insured,150 such cases did not
include “caused, in whole or in part, by” language. The
District of Maine instead relied upon recent federal court
decisions analyzing that language in particular, requiring
that the named insured be at least a proximate cause of the
injuries.151
148. See Pro Con, Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 794 F. Supp. 2d 242, 255–
58 (D. Me. 2011).
149. See MacArthur v. O’Connor Corp., 635 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D.R.I. 2009)
(“Vicarious liability by definition is ‘liability that a supervisory party . . . bears
for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate . . . based on the
relationship between the two parties.’ This definition comports exactly with the
language of the additional insured endorsement because [the additional insured]
is only covered in those instances when they are liable for the conduct of [the
named insured], their subordinate.” (citation omitted)).
150. Boise Cascade Corp. v. Reliance Nat’l Indem. Co., 129 F. Supp. 2d 41, 48
(D. Me. 2001) (“Based on the certificate [providing that the general contractor]
was an additional insured but only with respect to liability arising out of the
negligent acts or omissions of the [named insured,] . . . in no event would [the
general contractor] be entitled to coverage under the [insurance policy] for bodily
injury arising out of [the general contractor’s] own acts or omissions.”).
151. Pro Con, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 256–57; see also Dale Corp. v. Cumberland
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 09-1115, 2010 WL 4909600, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2010)
(finding that the allegations in the underlying complaint did not “trigger [the
insurer’s] duty to defend because they do not in any way implicate [the named
insured] as required by the additional insured endorsement,” which required a
showing that the injuries were caused “in whole or in part” by the named
insured’s negligence); Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Empire Steel Erectors, L.P., No. H-081707, 2010 WL 4791493, at *6–7 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2010) (“The new . . .
additional insured endorsement requires the injury to be ‘caused, in whole or in
part, by’ the named insured in order for coverage to be triggered. Thus, in the
absence of fault of the named insured, there should be no coverage for an
additional insured. . . . The inference [in the underlying state petition] that [the
employee] was at least partly at fault in causing his own injuries is sufficient to
trigger the duty to defend under the [insurer’s] policy.” (citations omitted)).
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Following this interpretation of “caused, in whole or in
part, by” as requiring proximate cause, the District of
Connecticut concluded
that Shawmut’s and Shepard’s “liability” must be “caused, in whole
or in part” by Fast Trek’s acts or omissions means that coverage
under the Additional Insured Endorsement is not limited to
Shawmut’s and Shepard’s vicarious liability for Fast Trek’s acts or
omissions but instead refers more broadly to liability that is caused,
at least in part, by Fast Trek, but excludes situations involving only
the independent acts of negligence of the additional insureds.152

Contrary to the insurer in Burlington, whose insured
was found without fault following NYCTA internal reports
on the incident, First Mercury was on notice from an
Occupational Safety and Health Administration report that
Fast Trek was at least partially at fault for the accident. 153
Thus, First Mercury was responsible for providing a defense
for Shawmut and Shepard.154
Other jurisdictions have followed similar reasoning. The
Southern District of Texas in Gilbane Building Co. v. Empire
Steel Erectors, L.P.155 couched its discussion of the duty to
defend under “caused, in whole or in part, by” language in
the concept of fault:
The new [2004 ISO] CG 20 10 additional insured endorsement
requires the injury to be “caused, in whole or in part, by” the named
insured in order for coverage to be triggered. Thus, in the absence
of fault of the named insured, there should be no coverage for an
additional insured.156

152. First Mercury, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 174.
153. First Mercury Ins. Co. v. Shawmut Woodworking & Supply, Inc., 660 F.
App’x. 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’g 48 F. Supp. 3d 158 (D. Conn. 2014). I again note
that the court in Burlington confronted the question of the insurer’s duty to
indemnify, rather than defend, although the concept of partial fault is pertinent
to each.
154. First Mercury, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 175.
155. No. H-08-1707, 2010 WL 4791493 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2010).
156. Id. at *6 (citing PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 11:63.50 (2010)).

AND O’CONNOR ON
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The underlying suit arose when Michael Parr, an
employee of Empire Steel Erectors, L.P. (Empire Steel) fell
off a ladder at a muddy construction site and was injured. 157
Mr. Parr sued the general contractor, Gilbane Building
Company (Gilbane), alleging negligence.158 Under their
contract, Empire Steel was required to secure a CGL
insurance policy naming Gilbane as an additional insured,
which was obtained from Admiral Insurance Company
(Admiral).159
Gilbane tendered its defense and indemnification to
Empire Steel and Admiral. 160 Admiral denied the tender and
disclaimed coverage, asserting that Gilbane was not an
additional insured under the policy, and that, even assuming
arguendo that Gilbane were an additional insured, the
complaint failed to explicitly allege that Empire Steel was at
fault, and in fact alleged that Mr. Parr’s “injuries were
brought about to occur, directly and proximately by reason of
the negligence of [Gilbane].”161
Again, the Southern District of Texas discussed the
general contractor’s additional insured status under a lens of
fault, declaring that where fault may exist on behalf of the
named insured, an insurer’s duty to defend is triggered. 162
Although Parr’s complaint alleged that Gilbane was directly
and proximately at fault for failing to provide working
elevators at all times despite heavy rainfall and muddy
conditions, the petition also stated Mr. Parr was indeed
employed by Empire Steel and performing work under a

157. Id. at *1.
158. Id. Gilbane ultimately settled with Parr for $165,000. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at *2.
161. Admiral Disclaimer Letter at 4, Gilbane Bldg. Co., 2010 WL 4791493 (S.D.
Tex. Nov. 16, 2010) (No. H-08-1707) (modification in original) (quoting Parr
Complaint, Gilbane Bldg. Co., 2010 WL 4791493 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2010)); see
also Gilbane Bldg. Co., 2010 WL 4791493, at *2, 6.
162. See Gilbane Bldg. Co., 2010 WL 4791493, at *6–7.
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contract with Gilbane, and that Mr. Parr’s injuries occurred
while he was walking down the ladder in muddy boots. 163
Thus, Admiral’s duty to defend Gilbane as an additional
insured was triggered where an inference could be drawn
that Parr was at least partly at fault for causing his own
injuries by failing to clean his boots prior to his descent.164
In James G. Davis Construction Corp. v. Erie Insurance
Exchange,165 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
confronted the ISO’s 2004 additional insured endorsement
language in this context of an insurer’s duty to defend as an
issue of first impression. On a home construction project in
Washington, D.C., James G. Davis Construction Corporation
(Davis) was hired as the general contractor.166 Davis enlisted
the help of several subcontractors for the project, including
Tricon Construction, Inc. (Tricon) to install drywall,
insulation, and fireplaces on site,167 as well as American
Mechanical Services, who in turn sub-subcontracted with
Frost Fire Insulation (Frost Fire) to perform air conditioning
and insulation work.168As per the subcontract agreement
between Tricon and Davis, Tricon was required to obtain a
CGL policy of insurance naming Davis as an additional
insured.169
With a general contractor, several subcontractors, and
even sub-subcontractors, James G. Davis Construction Corp.
is a reminder of the overlapping liabilities and
responsibilities involved in construction litigation and the
intricate insurance coverage scenarios that logically follow.
The underlying tort litigation arose from injuries sustained
by two Frost Fire employees when a scaffold, owned and
163. Id. at *6.
164. Id. at *7.
165. 126 A.3d 753 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015).
166. Id. at 755.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 756.
169. Id. at 755.
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installed by Tricon, collapsed while they were performing
their work.170 The injured employees alleged one count of
negligence against Tricon and another against Davis,
contending that they had Davis’ assurance that the
scaffolding was safe and secure, and were in fact authorized
to use Tricon’s scaffold at the time of collapse.171 Davis
tendered its defense to Erie Insurance Exchange (Erie), who
had provided Tricon with the insurance required under the
subcontract agreement.172 Erie declined to provide Davis
with a defense, arguing that Davis was not an additional
insured where the claims arose from its own negligence.173
With Maryland courts yet to construe an interpretation
of the “caused, in whole or in part, by” language included in
the Erie policy, the Court of Special Appeals relied on a
relatively contemporaneous interpretation of such language
by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.174 The Fourth
Circuit, relying upon the persuasive authority in Gilbane
Building Co., concluded that “the language is quite clear that
coverage is provided for the real estate development
company, an additional insured, for ‘property damages . . .
caused in whole or in part by’ the subcontractor.”175 Thus, as
was the case in Gilbane Bldg. Co., the Fourth Circuit held
that identical language to that at issue in this matter
“mean[t] that an insurer has a duty to defend an additional
insured ‘only if the underlying pleadings allege that’ the
named insured, ‘or someone acting on its behalf, proximately

170. Id.
171. Id. at 756–57.
172. Id. at 757.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 761 (citing Capital City Real Estate, LLC v. Certain Underwriters
at Lloyd’s London, Subscribing to Policy Number: ARTE018240, 788 F.3d 375,
379–380 (4th Cir. 2015)).
175. Id. at 761–62 (citing Capital City Real Estate, LLC v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, Subscribing to Policy Number: ARTE018240,
788 F.3d 375, 379–380 (4th Cir. 2015)).
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caused’ the injury or damage.”176
Again, as had been reasoned by the Fifth Circuit in
Gilbane Building Co., the Fourth Circuit shared in the
conclusion that the phrase “liability . . . caused, in whole or
in part, by” included in the additional insured endorsement
indicated coverage afforded to Davis
[could not] be limited exclusively to claims of vicarious liability for
Tricon’s acts. . . . [I]t is unreasonable to interpret the term “liability”
as used in the 2004 version of the ISO standard form additional
insured endorsement as referring to “vicarious liability” because
vicarious liability is an all or nothing proposition and thus a party
could not be vicariously liable ‘in part’ for the [named insured’s]
acts.
····
Indeed, because vicarious liability is used to impute liability to “an
innocent third party,” such liability cannot be caused merely “in
part.” The third party to whom liability is imputed would not be
“innocent” unless the wrongdoer’s acts caused the liability “in
whole.” We, therefore, hold that the word liability in the policy at
issue relates to proximate causation and not vicarious liability. 177

Determining that Davis was indeed an additional
insured under the Erie policy for liability caused either in
whole or in part by Tricon’s acts, the Fourth Circuit analyzed
whether the allegations in the complaint triggered Erie’s
duty to defend its additional insured.178 Under Maryland
law, in order for an insurer’s defense obligation to be
triggered, “the underlying tort suit need only allege action
that is potentially covered by the policy, no matter how
attenuated, frivolous, or illogical that allegation may be.” 179
176. Id. at 762 (citing Capital City Real Estate, LLC v. Certain Underwriters
at Lloyd’s London, Subscribing to Policy Number: ARTE018240, 788 F.3d 375,
379–380 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 664 F.3d
589, 598 (5th Cir. 2011))).
177. Id. at 762.
178. Id. at 762–63.
179. Id. at 762 (quoting Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 679 A.2d 540 (Md.
1996)). This language closely relates to the language followed in many states,
including New York, which provides coverage if allegations in the complaint raise
matters which may be covered, no matter if they are “groundless, false or
fraudulent.” See, e.g., Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 343 N.E.2d 758, 758 (N.Y.
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Thus, Erie was required to defend Davis if the allegations in
the complaint potentially triggered coverage under the Erie
policy by alleging that Tricon proximately caused the Frost
Fire employees’ injuries.180
The complaint in the underlying action asserted that
both Tricon and Davis fell short of the requisite reasonable
care “in erecting, positioning, and maintaining the
scaffolding,” leading to the Frost Fire employees’ injuries.181
Moreover, both Tricon and Davis were alleged to have been
the “controlling employer at the construction site” and “had
general supervisory authority over the construction site
including the authority to correct safety violations.” 182 The
complaint, in fact, alleged negligence on behalf of Tricon
alone, Davis alone, and Tricon and Davis together, in
generating liability for the injuries of the Frost Fire
employees.183
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland concluded that had the lower court analyzed
whether Davis’s liability was alleged to have arisen out of
Tricon’s ongoing operations, it would have concluded that
Davis’s liability was alleged to be “caused in whole, or in
part” by the acts or omissions of Tricon while performing its
“ongoing operations” for Davis.184 Thus, such a finding would
have compelled the conclusion that Davis had been sued for
“‘liability arising out of’ Tricon’s ‘ongoing operations
performed for’ Davis,” triggering the duty to defend Davis as
an additional insured.185
Amidst uncertainty on the question of the named
insured’s potential liability, with the duty to defend granted
1975).
180. James G. Davis Construction Corp., 126 A.3d at 763.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 764.
185. Id.
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such a breadth of application, the case law above suggests
that the insurer may be without recourse. However, potential
recourse for insurance companies may rest where torts and
insurance law overlaps, an area courts are reluctant to
discuss explicitly.
IV. POST-BURLINGTON REALITY AND PALSGRAF-IAN STYLE
PROXIMATE CAUSE ENTERING THE REALM OF INSURANCE LAW
Despite understandable commentary expressing the
view that the realms of tort and insurance law should be kept
separate during the course of litigation, Part IV attempts to
dispel such legal-fiction in light of Burlington and the
infiltration of Palsgraf-ian proximate cause across this
eroding no-man’s land. Recent caselaw in New York
discussed in this Part has not foreclosed the extension of
Palsgraf-ian proximate cause beyond the “vacuum of nonliability,” and it is foreseeable that Burlington may invoke
sweeping change in the area of risk transfer under
construction contracts.
Scholars in insurance law caution of the dangers of
analogizing to the tort-based conceptions of but-for and
proximate causation, claiming such comparisons are
“unhelpful and often extremely misleading in an insurance
law context.”186 The concept of legal or proximate causation
in the realm of tort may foreclose liability against actors or
entities without responsibility for a loss, distribute
responsibility among various potential causal agents, and
sever liability for consequences tenuously related to remote
causes.187 Tools such as proximate cause in tort law
were created specifically for fault-based inquiry. Using those same
tools in insurance settings changes the contractual analysis in a
fundamental way. It opens the door for morality-based decision
patterns which produce illogical and unpredictable results in a
186. Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion about Causation in Insurance: Solutions for
Catastrophic Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957, 970 (2010).
187. Banks McDowell, Causation in Contracts and Insurance, 20 CONN. L. REV.
569, 570 (1988).
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contractual sphere. The proximate or dominant cause approach to
insurance
causation . . .
advocates
choosing
the
most
“blameworthy” cause. It borrows heavily from proximate cause
analysis in tort. There is a marked tendency in cases that adopt a
dominant cause approach to implicitly assess relative “blame” or
“fault” to a certain cause of a loss in a way other than as one of a
faultless series of potential insurance coverage triggers. Coverage
decisions then get made with reference, implicitly or explicitly, to
the cause with the greatest relative blameworthiness. Read any
insurance policy. No clause grants an insured coverage rights based
on which loss trigger was most at fault in the moral sense of the
word. The policies grant coverage based on the mere existence of a
causal event that brought about a “happening” in reality. That is as
lofty as “cause” is put in the insurance world.188

It is this dichotomy of insurance and tort that must be
navigated for every case that calls for insurance coverage to
ultimately indemnify an insured. However, “[w]hile
causation is a pervasive problem in torts and not an
important one in contracts, actions on insurance policies lie
somewhere between the two.”189 Although the question we
have analyzed thus far can be viewed as a trigger of coverage
for defense and indemnity costs in contract law, the trigger
for additional insured status under “liability caused, in
whole or in part” language following Burlington is, in
practice, one of fault or blameworthiness firmly entrenched
between these spheres.190 As was the case in Burlington,
although a named insured can undisputedly be the cause-infact that generates a loss, should the named insured’s
conduct be less at fault, if at all, the blameworthy party and
its insurer should bear the loss.191
188. Knutsen, supra note 186, at 971 (footnotes omitted).
189. McDowell, supra note 187, at 571.
190. Usually a determination as to whether coverage exists or is excluded for
the named insured’s liability under a policy consists of determining whether the
behavioral trigger occurred within the language of the policy, and is a question
not of “‘who is to blame and why’ but merely ‘what happened.’” Knutsen, supra
note 186, at 969. However, the New York Court of Appeals requirement of fault
on behalf of the named insured in Burlington prior to assigning additional
insured status indicates that such a determination is more similar to a question
of “who is to blame and why?”
191. See Burlington Ins. Co. v NYC Transit Auth., 79 N.E.3d 477, 484 (N.Y.
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Though insurance is arguably “the backbone of the tort
system, it is not the tort system.”192 Instead, “[i]t is a
contractually driven loss-spreading mechanism.”193 Courts
attempt ad nauseam to maintain the separation between the
parallel realms of tort and insurance law,194 however
concepts like proximate cause inherently tend to blend them
together.195 One particularly poignant example is the ethical
concerns surrounding third-party payment taken in
conjunction with the insurer’s duty to defend in the tort
sphere. Although the insurer’s duty to defend an insured
requires the compensation of an attorney to defend the
insured in the underlying tort, this attorney is ethically
required to honor the best interests of his client—the
insured—and not the carrier.196 Thus, the separation of tort
and insurance law exaggerates the lack of incentives for both
the plaintiff and defendant in an underlying tort action to
present, for example, an intentional conduct argument with
any gusto, whereby coverage would not exist. 197 Such a
2017) (“Although but for [the named insured’s] machine coming into contact with
the live cable, the explosion would not have occurred and the employee would not
have fallen or been injured, that triggering act was not the proximate cause of
the employee’s injuries since [the named insured] was not at fault in operating
the machine in the manner that led it to touch the live cable.”).
192. Knutsen, supra note 186, at 970.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Kaczmarek v. Shoffstall, 119 A.D.2d 1001, 1002 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986) (holding that an insurance company’s interests in the amount of the loss
from an underlying tort case “are unrelated to the subject matter of the action
and can in no way be characterized as claims or defenses to the action”). Any
discussion of coverage is a fiction in the underlying civil litigation, and the jury
should not hear about those issues, lest it impermissibly sway the fact-finders’
decision. These issues are instead discussed in a separate declaratory judgment
action brought by the insurer, or subsequent direct action by a judgment creditor.
195. Knutsen, supra note 186, at 971–72.
196. See Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 425 N.E.2d 810, 815 n.* (N.Y.
1981).
197. For an interesting example of this point, see Auto. Ins. Co. of Hartford v.
Cook, 850 N.E.2d 1152 (N.Y. 2006). The Court in Cook held that a defense
obligation existed because of allegations in the complaint of “negligently playing
with a loaded shotgun; negligently pointing that shotgun at the abdomen of the
decedent; negligently discharging that shot gun [sic] into the decedent’s
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finding of intentional conduct would not only limit the ability
of an injured party to receive compensation from an insolvent
defendant, but alternatively limit the ability of a defendant
to fulfill a judgment entered against them.198 Despite the
existence of a broad duty to defend, the inherent lack of
representation of the insurer’s interests in an underlying tort
action results in the insurer protecting its interest through
contemporaneous or subsequent declaratory judgment
actions in the insurance sphere, based upon the ultimate
question of indemnity.
In the aftermath of Burlington, no New York court has
yet foreclosed the possibility that an insurer’s
indemnification obligation to a potential additional insured
may be eliminated on proximate cause grounds where the
named insured was only tenuously at fault. The first postBurlington decision in New York to directly apply its
abdomen”, despite facts consisting of the following:
[F]our individuals gathered in the kitchen where Barber began
demanding money from Cook while pounding his fists on the kitchen
table. Cook, alarmed, drew his gun and demanded that they leave his
house. Barber apparently laughed at the small size of the pistol, at which
point Cook withdrew to his bedroom for a larger weapon. He picked up
a loaded, 12 gauge shotgun and stood in his living room at the far end of
his pool table. Cook again ordered them to leave the house. Although
Barber started to head toward the door with his companions, he stopped
at the opposite end of the pool table, turned to face Cook and told his
companions to take anything of value, and that he would meet them
outside because he had some business to attend to. When Barber
menacingly started advancing toward Cook, Cook warned him that he
would shoot if he came any closer. Cook aimed his gun toward the lowest
part of Barber’s body that was not obscured by the pool table—his navel.
When Barber was about one step away from the barrel of the gun, Cook
fired a shot into Barber’s abdomen. Barber died later that day at a
hospital.
Id. at 1154. While Cook was acquitted of criminal charges involving intentional
conduct, id., the evidentiary standard in a civil case is much lower. However,
neither Cook nor the decedent wanted to see the insurance policy removed from
the equation by arguing intentional conduct. See id.
198. The insurer is not without recourse, however, as it can protect its own
interests separately by “litigating the issue of indemnification in a subsequent
[or parallel] action in the event of a judgment for plaintiff in the personal injury
action.” Kaczmarek, 119 A.D.2d at 1002.
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principles to the broad duty to defend was handed down in
February 2018, but what was most interesting was its
position (or lack thereof) on the insurer’s indemnification
obligation.199 New York’s First Department in Vargas v. City
of New York, although acknowledging that proximate cause
is necessary to establish a duty to indemnify, 200 remained
true to New York’s BP A.C. Corp. v. OneBeacon Insurance
Group,201 and applied the same broad duty to defend in the
additional insured context as had existed for a named
insured.202 In essence, where the allegations in the complaint
raised the possibility of negligent causation by the named
insured, an insurer cannot avoid its duty to defend an entity
that was included in the policy as an additional insured,
unless proximate causation has specifically been
eliminated.203
In Vargas, the City of New York (the City) contracted
with E.E. Cruz & Tully Construction Co., a Joint Venture,
LLC (Joint Venture) as general contractor for a construction
project.204 Joint Venture enlisted the help of a painting
subcontractor, L&L Painting Co., Inc. (L&L) for the project,
contractually requiring L&L to procure insurance that
named Joint Venture and the City as additional insureds. 205

199. See Vargas v. City of New York, 71 N.Y.S.3d 415 (App. Div. 2018).
200. Id. at 417 (“[I]t was premature to declare that [the insurer] is obliged to
indemnify the . . . defendants. . . . It has not yet been determined if [the
subcontractor] was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury.” (citing Burlington
Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Auth., 79 N.E.3d 477 (2017))).
201. 871 N.E.2d 1128 (N.Y. 2007) (holding that an insurer’s defense obligation
is no different for an additional insured as it exists for a named insured on a
policy).
202. Vargas, 71 N.Y.S.3d at 417.
203. Until such time as a court severs the causal chain for an entity onepercent or more at fault, it would seem that the court’s definition of “proximate
cause” in this context is an all-or-nothing proposition in practice, rather than
proximate cause in the “Palsgraf-ian” sense.
204. Vargas, 71 N.Y.S.3d at 417.
205. Id. I have focused my attention on endorsements one through three, which
required causation beyond the requirement of endorsement four. Id.
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L&L obtained a CGL policy from Liberty Insurance
Underwriters Inc. (Liberty) that named Joint Venture and
the City as additional insureds.206 In turn, L&L subsubcontracted with Camabo Industries, Inc. (Camabo). 207
The plaintiff, Robert Vargas, was an employee of
Camabo who alleged injuries from lead dust exposure that
occurred while working on the City’s project. 208 Liberty
contended that under additional insured endorsements one
through three in the policy issued to L&L, the City was not
considered an additional insured because Vargas’s injury
had not been caused by L&L or those acting on its behalf.209
The New York Supreme Court held that Liberty was
required to defend and indemnify the City defendants in the
underlying action.210 Taking issue with that holding, New
York’s First Department Appellate Division held that “it was
premature to declare that Liberty is obliged to indemnify the
City defendants” because it had “not yet been determined if
L&L was the proximate cause of [Vargas’s] injury.”211
Instead, the Appellate Division held that “[t]he limitations in
[the] endorsements . . . do not vitiate Liberty’s duty to
defend, because the . . . complaint brings the insurance claim
at least ‘potentially within the protection purchased.’”212 The
complaint alleged “that all defendants—which includes
L&L—operated, maintained, managed, and controlled the
job site” and “also . . . that all defendants were negligent and
failed to provide a safe job site.”213 Therefore, the court held

206. Id.
207. Vargas v. City of New York, No. 154323/13, 2016 WL 184531, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, 2016).
208. Id.
209. Vargas, 71 N.Y.S.3d at 417.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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“it is possible that plaintiff’s injury was caused by L&L.”214
The court in Vargas determined that where the
possibility of causation exists on the face of the pleadings, the
“caused, in whole or in part, by” language requires an insurer
to fulfill their defense obligation for an additional insured
unless, as was the case in Burlington, proximate cause has
been ruled out entirely. But how far exactly would a court be
willing to apply the Palsgraf-ian brand of proximate cause
adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in Burlington?
The fact that New York’s First Department expressly
took issue with the lower court’s premature finding of a duty
to indemnify is important and should not be overlooked.
Although Vargas solidified that New York courts interpret
“caused, in whole or in part, by” to require a defense
obligation of a potential additional insured as the majority of
jurisdictions have, the decision makes it possible215 that a
duty to indemnify potential additional insureds may be
eliminated where the named insureds may be one-percent or
more at fault.216
Following Vargas, New York’s First Department doubled
down on its application of the Palsgraf-ian proximate cause
214. Id.
215. Admittedly improbable, but possible, nonetheless. See generally DUMB
DUMBER (New Line Cinema 1994) (“So you’re telling me there’s a chance?”
(statement by Lloyd Christmas)).
AND

216. See BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 21, § 11:334 (positing that the “1%”
fault of the named insured only establishes the initial broad defense obligation
and admitting that, beyond that, the additional insured triggering language
“caused, in whole or in part, by” poses some problems). I contend that one such
problem as referred to by Bruner and O’Connor is the exact extent to which
proximate cause may limit small percentages of fault of the named insured. But
see TURNER, supra note 22, § 42:4 (“[F]or there to be insurance for the additional
insured named in the endorsement, the named insured must be negligent at least
in part. . . . Thus, if the additional insured can show that the named insured was
as little as 1% of the cause of the claimant’s injury or damage, this requirement
of the endorsement is met. This may not prove to be a very formidable obstacle.”).
Turner, like many insurance law commentators, turns a blind eye to the realities
that exist between tort and insurance law in practice. Although intended to be
kept separate, there is blending and blurring of the lines between these spheres,
including the concept of Palsgraf-ian proximate cause invading insurance law.
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principles of Burlington in Hanover Insurance Co. v.
Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co.,217 this time within
the vacuum of non-liability that was present in the original
New York Court of Appeals Burlington decision.218 In only
the second application of Burlington’s holding within the
New York court system, it is crystal clear that where there is
no theory of liability that applies to an insurance company’s
named insured, there is no defense or indemnification
obligation that extends to the additional insured under the
“caused, in whole or in part, by” language. 219
The Hanover case, unlike the other cases that have been
discussed so far, had nothing to do with construction
contracts. In Hanover, Michael Green was injured following
a slip and fall alleged to have occurred while he was working
in his capacity as a security guard employed by Protection
Plus Security Consultants, Inc. (Protection Plus) at a facility
owned by Manhattan School of Music.220 Protection Plus
contracted with the Manhattan School of Music to provide
security services and, pursuant to that contract, was
obligated to maintain liability insurance that provided
coverage for the Manhattan School as an additional
insured.221 Protection Plus procured a CGL insurance policy
from Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (PIIC)
that named Manhattan School as an additional insured, but
“only with respect to liability for bodily injury caused, in
whole or in part, by (1) [Protection Plus’s] acts or omissions;
or (2) [t]he acts or omissions of those acting on [Protection

217. 73 N.Y.S.3d 549 (App. Div. 2018). The facts in this case are more
comparable to the facts as they existed in the original Burlington decision, and
do not shed as much light on the potential reach of Palsgraf-ian proximate cause
in the insurance industry.
218. For more discussion regarding the vacuum of non-liability, see discussion
supra Part II.
219. See Hanover, 73 N.Y.S.3d at 549.
220. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Hanover, 73 N.Y.S.3d 549 (No.
154006/14).
221. Id.
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Plus’s] behalf; in the performance of [Protection Plus’s]
ongoing operations for [Manhattan School].”222
New York’s First Department reversed the lower court’s
decision, which had held that “Philadelphia Indemnity ha[d]
a duty to indemnify Manhattan School, but only to the extent
that it is determined to be vicariously liable for the negligent
acts of Protection Plus.”223 Instead, the “caused, in whole or
in part” language was interpreted by the First Department
to conclude that “coverage is extended to an additional
insured only when the damages are the result of the named
insured’s negligence or some other act or omission,” and “the
acts or omissions of Protection Plus were not a proximate
cause of the security guard’s injury,” but “[r]ather, the sole
proximate cause of the injury was the additional insured,
and thus coverage is not available to the Manhattan School
under defendant’s policy.”224
One recent decision rendered by the Eastern District of
New York, United States Underwriters Insurance Company
v. Image By J&K, LLC, provides an interesting gloss on
decisions like Burlington and Hanover, which fall within the
vacuum of non-liability.225 There, District Judge Margo
Brodie framed the vacuum of non-liability existing in
Burlington in terms of the necessity—or rather lack
thereof—of a court’s weighing of the merits.226 Judge Brodie
opined that “the challenge before the New York Court of
Appeals [in Burlington] did not implicate the merits of the
underlying action.”227 After all, an insurer’s duty to defend

222. Id. at 24 (alterations in original).
223. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., No. 154006/2014, 2015
WL 6920605, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015), rev’d, 73 N.Y.S.3d 549 (App. Div. 2018).
224. Hanover, N.Y.S.3d at 549–50 (citing Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit
Auth., 79 N.E.3d 477 (N.Y. 2017)).
225. No. 16-CV-6176, 2018 WL 4055298, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018).
226. Id.
227. Id.
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exists even for those claims entirely devoid of merit. 228
Rather, “[a]t most, the New York Court of Appeals
determined the allocation of fault between the named
insured and the potential additional insureds as to any
liability arising from the underlying action.”229 In doing so,
Judge Brodie acknowledged the weighing of fault that plays
a role in Palsgraf-ian proximate cause determinations styled
under Burlington. Should the balance weigh in favor of the
elimination of the named insured’s liability, then there could
potentially be the elimination of additional insured status for
an upstream entity.
It is readily apparent that any battle involving New York
courts constraining proximate cause in light of a named
insured’s tenuous fault will not be fought in a case focused
on this threshold question of an insurer’s duty to defend. The
duty to defend an additional insured under the ISO’s 2004
language is triggered merely by allegations proffered against
the named insured in the complaint.230 Thus, any allegation
of fault posited against the named insured triggers this
defense obligation until such time as the court has deemed
that either the insurer is without an obligation to indemnify
for the loss, or the entity claiming additional insured status
is not, in fact, an additional insured under the policy.
Instead, this battle will likely be waged in an insurer’s
declaratory judgment action on facts in which the loss would
be entirely covered by either the “upstream” entity’s own
carrier, or the subcontractor’s carrier under a theory of
additional insured status.231 Although tension exists
228. Id.
229. Id. (citing Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Auth., 79 N.E.3d 477 (N.Y.
2017) (“[I]f the parties desire a different allocation of risk, they are free to
negotiate language that serves their interests.”)).
230. BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 21, § 11:334.
231. To contrast this view, Randy Maniloff has commented that
most coverage claims are resolved without a declaratory judgment and
involve determinations of coverage for underlying claims that were
settled without the benefit of a trial or other fact-finding mechanism.
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regarding a court’s consideration of insurance coverage while
in the tort sphere of litigation,232 such considerations are
part and parcel in insurance litigation that follows the
underlying tort determination.233 Thus, a determination
Thus, the question of just who was at fault for an injury may never have
an opportunity to be determined by a neutral arbiter. . . . Considering
that underlying complaints are sometimes artfully drafted with
insurance coverage fully in mind, these consequences of the revisions to
ISO’s additional insured endorsements may not be so unintentional after
all, at least not from plaintiff’s counsel’s perspective. For these reasons,
while ISO’s newest version of form CG 20 10 is a nice effort, it may fall
victim to circumstances beyond its control.
Maniloff, supra note 22, at M.23-9. I suggest that, in the years since Maniloff
published his May 2004 piece (prior to implementation of the ISO’s July 2004
revisions), the court’s use of Palsgraf-ian proximate cause provides a reason for
declaratory judgment actions to sever the chain of causation and eliminate a
costly duty to defend. Maniloff’s piece does not mention the concept of proximate
cause. Had Maniloff been aware of the application of Palsgraf-ian proximate
cause to this language, he may very well have thought differently of the use of
declaratory judgment in such a scenario.
232. Jane Stapleton, Tort, Insurance and Ideology, 58 MOD. L. REV. 820, 831
(1995) (“[I]f comparative insurability is to be used as a factor influencing tort
liability in all cases . . ., by what criteria are we to evaluate who is the ‘better’ or
‘cheaper’ insurer, especially given that both sides will nearly always be able to
insure at some price?”).
233. Courts routinely discuss the availability of coverage within the
automobile accident context, where public policy in the third-party liability
sphere errs on the side of providing coverage for the injuries to innocent victims.
See Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp. v. Cont’l Nat’l Am. Grp., 319 N.E.2d
182, 184–85 (N.Y. 1974) (requiring a rental car agency’s insurer to cover injuries
sustained in an accident on a theory of constructive consent for a technically nonpermissive user of the vehicle because of New York’s public policy that “one
injured by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle should have recourse to a
financially responsible defendant”); Thrasher v. U.S. Liab. Ins. Co., 225 N.E.2d
503, 508 (N.Y. 1967) (imposing a heavy burden on an insurer to establish lack of
cooperation for denying coverage in a third-party auto liability case because “the
policy of this State [is] that innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents be
recompensed for the injuries inflicted upon them”). Although we confront a
question as to which insurer should ultimately pay as opposed to the Hobson’s
choice of whether a single insurer should pay or not, it is important that in
insurance law, courts routinely make these types of determinations while
considering the availability of coverage. A New York court would only remove the
obligations of the subcontractor’s insurer through a theory of the lack of Palsgrafian proximate cause if the loss can entirely be covered by another policy.
Otherwise, the court would err on keeping both policies in play, so as to either
split the costs as concurrent primary coverage, or determine priority of coverage
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based upon blameworthiness could potentially lead a court
to favor imposing the indemnification obligation on the
“upstream” entity’s carrier, where the “downstream”
subcontractor was only tenuously at fault for the loss,
provided the loss is fully covered by either insurer.
As an example, assume the following facts. A general
contractor (General) enters into a contract with a
subcontractor (Sub-C) to clear a building of its contents prior
to its demolition by General. The contract requires that SubC obtain a CGL policy naming General as an additional
insured for “liability caused, in whole or in part, by” Sub-C’s
acts or omissions. General had scheduled the demolition for
March 24, and informed Sub-C that it was safe to perform
the task of clearing the building through March 23. On
March 22, Sub-C informed General that its work was
completed as of that day. Without communicating with SubC, General decided to proceed with demolition on March 23
instead of March 24. On March 23, Joe Employee, who was
employed by Sub-C, arrived for work because Sub-C failed to
inform him that the work was completed, and Joe Employee
is killed when the building is imploded. Although Sub-C may
be at fault for failing to communicate with Joe Employee that
the work within the building was completed, no court would
find such a failure to communicate as a proximate cause of
the death, which was ultimately caused by General’s failure
to communicate the change in the date of demolition.
The allegations of Joe Employee’s Estate in the ensuing
wrongful death complaint against General234 may very well
by labelling one as primary and the other as excess coverage. See BP Air
Conditioning Corp. v. OneBeacon Ins. Grp., 871 N.E.2d 1128, 1133 (N.Y. 2007).
234. Sub-C itself would be protected from suit by Joe Employee’s Estate under
N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW §§ 10, 11 (McKinney 2018), which provides protections
for employers against lawsuits brought for “death from injury arising out of and
in the course of employment without regard to fault as a cause of the injury . . . .”
It is extremely important to understand the ramifications of the ISO’s July 2004
revisions in light of workers’ compensation laws. See Maniloff, supra note 22, at
M.23-7 (“The plaintiff in an underlying tort case giving rise to potential
additional insured coverage is often an employee of the named insured. However,
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imply that the death resulted from Sub-C’s negligent failure
to communicate to its employees that work in a building to
be imploded was complete, while also including allegations,
inter alia, of negligent failure to communicate the shift in
demolition schedule on behalf of General. Under such
circumstances, the insurer would initially be required to
provide a defense to General as a potential additional
insured, given the allegations of possible liability for both
General and Sub-C235 in the complaint. However, if the
insurer filed a parallel declaratory judgment action236 to
judicially determine the issue of the general contractor’s
status as an additional insured, the court would be required
to analyze proximate causation regarding the conduct of SubC.
The New York Court of Appeals in Burlington applied
proximate cause in the Palsgraf-ian sense, recognizing that
the law could “arbitrarily decline[] to trace a series of events
beyond a certain point” for reason “of convenience, of public
policy, [or] a rough sense of justice.”237 Under the factual
because of the workmen’s compensation bar [on recovery], the plaintiff’s
complaint may not allege any negligence on the part of his employer (named
insured), even if it in fact existed. In this situation, because the duty to defend is
typically determined based solely on the allegations contained in the underlying
complaint, the additional insured may be denied a defense because the
underlying complaint is devoid of any allegations that the plaintiff’s injury was
caused ‘in whole or in part by your [named insured’s] acts or omissions; or the
acts or omissions of those acting on your behalf,’ as required by form CG 20 10 07
04.” (second alteration in original)).
235. Again, N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2018) does not
eliminate the liability of an employer, but rather replaces any underlying liability
with liability as defined in N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 10 (McKinney 2018).
Thus, Sub-C may potentially have underlying liability as alleged in the
complaint, despite such liability being replaced for the purposes of compensation
to Joe Employee’s Estate on behalf of Sub-C under New York’s workers’
compensation law.
236. For estoppel reasons, counsel is reminded to name the injured party as a
defendant in the action as well, or else risk re-litigating the nonbinding
determination with the party unrepresented in the original declaratory judgment
action.
237. Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Auth., 79 N.E.3d 477, 482 (N.Y. 2017)
(citing Ventricelli v. Kinney Sys. Rent A Car, 383 N.E.2d 1149, 1149–50 (N.Y.
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scenario above, such Palsgraf-ian proximate cause would
allow a court to judicially determine that, although Sub-C is
tenuously at fault for failing to communicate with its
employee, its omission was not the proximate cause of Joe
Employee’s death. Such a determination would mean that
there was no triggering of additional insured status for
General under the holding in Burlington, since the named
insured’s omission was not a proximate cause of the death as
a matter of law.238 Instead, General would be required to
tender its defense and indemnity to its own insurer for the
underlying action brought by Joe Employee’s Estate.
Whether the court arrived at this determination by way of a
“rough sense of justice” or because of “public policy” concerns,
the most blameworthy party would be held accountable
through its own insurer.
Although not quite as extreme as the above hypothetical,
a recent New York Fourth Department decision, Pioneer
Central School District v. Preferred Mutual Insurance Co.
helps to augment the limits placed on Burlington’s Palsgrafian proximate cause determination along a similar vein.239
In Pioneer Central, J&K Kleanerz of WNY, LLC (Kleanerz),
contracted with Pioneer Central School District and Pioneer
Middle School (collectively, Pioneer) to provide janitorial
services.240 As part of that contract, Kleanerz was required
to “indemnify Pioneer in actions for bodily injury ‘arising or
resulting from any act, omission, neglect or misconduct of

1978) (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting))).
238. See Burlington, 79 N.E.3d at 483–84 (“While . . . interpreting the phrases
[‘arising out of’ and ‘caused . . . by’] differently does not compel the conclusion
that the endorsement incorporates a negligence requirement (citation omitted),
it does compel us to interpret ‘caused, in whole or in part’ to mean more than ‘but
for’ causation. That interpretation, coupled with the endorsement’s application
to acts or omissions that result in liability, supports our conclusion that
proximate cause is required here.” (citations omitted)).
239. No. 1067, 2018 WL 4845825 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 5, 2018).
240. Id. at *1.
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[Kleanerz].’”241 Kleanerz procured an insurance policy
through Preferred Mutual Insurance Company (Preferred
Mutual) that named Pioneer “as an additional insured for
bodily injury ‘caused, in whole or in part, by’ the ‘acts or
omissions’ of Kleanerz or of those acting on Kleanerz’s
behalf.”242
While leaving the Pioneer premises, a Kleanerz
employee, Dawn Ayers, slipped on snow or ice in the Pioneer
Middle School parking lot and sustained injuries.243 After
Ms. Ayers filed suit against Pioneer to recover for her
injuries, Pioneer filed a third-party action against
Kleanerz.244 Additionally, Pioneer filed this declaratory
judgment action against Preferred Mutual, asserting that
the insurer was obligated to defend and indemnify them in
Ms. Ayers’ underlying lawsuit.245
In concluding that Pioneer did not qualify as an
additional insured under the Preferred Mutual policy, the
Fourth Department noted that “it is undisputed that
Kleanerz was not responsible for clearing ice and snow from
the parking lot and that Ayers’s fall resulted from her
slipping on the ice or snow.”246 The court stated Pioneer
should not be afforded the status of additional insured under
the policy where Kleanerz’s instructions to exit out a certain
door “merely furnished the occasion for the injury” by
“fortuitously plac[ing Ayers] in a location or position in
which . . . [an alleged] separate instance of negligence acted
independently upon [her] to produce harm.”247 Therefore,

241. Id. (alteration in original).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. (quoting Hain v. Jamison, 68 N.E.3d 1233 (N.Y. 2016)); see also Hain
v. Jamison, 68 N.E.3d 1233, 1238 (N.Y. 2016) (“Proximate cause is, at its core, a
uniquely fact-specific determination, and ‘[d]epending upon the nature of the
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Preferred Mutual had no indemnity obligation to Pioneer
“and consequently no duty to defend [Pioneer] in the pending
[Ayers] action.”248
In Pioneer, it is certainly noteworthy that the Fourth
Department placed the duty of snow removal outside of the
discussion as an undisputed fact.249 However, this falls
entirely short of those cases, like Burlington and Hanover,
that find themselves in the vacuum of non-liability. There, it
was a party’s “liability” that was undisputed. In Pioneer, the
court, in essence, chose to weigh comparative fault between
parties in similar fashion to the framing of the issue by
District Judge Brodie in United States Underwriters
Insurance Company v. Image By J&K, LLC. This was not a
merit-based determination in Pioneer, but rather one based
entirely on the comparative fault of a party merely
“furnish[ing] the occasion for injury” and a party failing to
clear snow and ice from a parking lot despite its duty to do
so.250 As caselaw continues to accumulate, it is entirely
plausible to anticipate a gradual expansion of this faultbased decision-making approach to Palsgraf-ian proximate
cause under Burlington.251
V. CONCLUSION
The additional insured endorsement within any CGL
case, a variety of factors may be relevant in assessing legal cause’. Such factors
include, among other things . . .public policy considerations regarding the scope
of liability.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
248. Pioneer, 2018 WL 4845825, at *2 (alterations in original) (quoting Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Zuk, 574 N.E.2d 1035, 1038 (N.Y. 1991)).
249. Id. at *1.
250. Pioneer, 2018 WL 4845825, at *1.
251. But see Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Alma Tower, LLC, No. 7433, 2018 WL
5259566, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 23, 2018) aff’g, No. 159286/2014, 2017 WL
3438141 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 9, 2017) (contrasting with the Fourth Department
in Pioneer, New York’s First Department holds that the mere existence of an
employer/employee relationship between claimant and named insured was
enough to trigger “a reasonable possibility” that the named insured “may have
proximately caused the underlying injury”).
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policy plays a crucial role in the construction industry.
Property owners and general contractors relying upon these
endorsements in policies issued to “downstream”
subcontractors must be aware of the current landscape of
coverage for additional insureds, and specifically that courts
have interpreted the language “caused, in whole or in part,
by” as requiring proximate cause. While courts have broadly
applied the insurer’s defense obligation to potential
additional insureds where liability on behalf of the
“downstream” named insured is uncertain, the New York
Court of Appeals, citing Palsgraf-ian proximate cause, has
limited the scope of this language for purposes of an insurer’s
duty to indemnify, severing the chain of causation. Although
the Court of Appeals in Burlington Insurance Co. v. NYC
Transit Authority was not required to determine the full
extent to which the concept of Palsgraf-ian proximate cause
may bleed from the tort sphere to insurance law, decisions
like Vargas v. City of New York certainly have not foreclosed
a court’s severing of legal causation in light of a named
insured’s tenuous fault.
To be sure, existing insurance case law has solely used
proximate cause to sever the chain of legal causation where
the named insured lacked fault within the “vacuum of nonliability,” resembling a traditional contract trigger. However,
cases like Pioneer Central School District blur the line
between this vacuum of non-liability and the type of faultbased determinations required under Palsgraf-ian
proximate cause. The invocation of Palsgraf in the realm of
insurance raises questions as to the ultimate scope of its
application. Albeit unlikely, if given the appropriate
combination of facts and insurance coverage, blameworthy
general contractors and property owners should take heed
knowing that Palsgraf-ian proximate cause in the realm of
insurance law may allow a court to sever the legal chain of
causation beyond traditional insurance triggers.

